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Ghana's structural  adjustmentprogram  was  very  beneficial  to its
cocoa sector. Although world cocoa prices fell as a result of
Ghana's expansion,  the decline was much less than that from
production  expansions  by other major producers.
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Structural adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan  have been at almost half its 1989-90 level if
African countries in the 1980s removed trade  Gharna  had not implemented its structural
restrictions, price controls, and export taxes and  adjustment program.  The producers' surplus
abolished state-owned commodity marketing  would have been lower without the program, and
bodies.  Coleman, Akiyama, and Varangis  the government's budget deficit would have been
studied the effects of these policy changes on the  unsustainable.
cocoa sector, using a global econometric model
specifying major producer countries through the  The effects of the structural adjustment
vintage-capital approach. They focused on  program in Nigeria are mixed. The simulation
Ghana and Nigeria (major cocoa producers that  results show lower cocoa production but higher
,;ndertook structural adjustment programs), as  government revenue without the reforms. But the
well as on Cote d'Ivoire  and Cameroon.  program was evaluated only three years after the
reforms, so the full effects on production had not
The impact on world cocoa prices of struc-  been realized.
tural adjustment programs in Ghana and Nigeria
was relatively small. The results imply that,  The structural adjustment programs in Ghana
without structural adjustment programs in Ghana  and Nigeria had a negative effect on other cocoa-
and Nigeria,  vorld cocoa prices in the late 1980s  producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and
would have been about US$1,060/ton (in 1985  the rest of the world - producing an estimated
constant dollars), instead of US$850/ton. So,  loss (in government revenue from cocoa exports
withoult  the structural adjustment programs,  and producer surplus) of about 15 percent in
1989-90 world prices in real terms would have  other Sub-Saharan African countries.
been about 45 pei cent lower than they were in
the early 1980s, compared with an actual decline  Results show that both Cote d'Ivoire  and
of 55 percent.  Cameroon would have been better off had they
set export taxes at a higher level (closer to an
Much more important in depressing prices in  estimated "optimal" level) at the same time that
this period was the rapid increase in production  they depreciated the real exchange rate. Producer
in Brazil, CMte  d'lvoire,  Indonesia, and Malaysia  prices could have been sustained at their earlier
(which together accounted for about 75 percent  higher level, or even raised, without hurting
of the increased production in that decade). That  government revenues.
increased production resulted largely from tree
planting in response to higher world cocoa prices  Structural adjustment programs in Ghana
in the late 1970s  - and subsequent increases in  and Nigeria had a negative effect on producers in
productivity.  other countries, but not adopting such policies
would have been economically irrational,
The results of counterfactual simulations  contend Coleman, Akiyama, and Varangis.
suggest that cocoa production in Ghana would
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1.  1.  BDackgroun
During the 1970s  and 1980s,  the economic  performance  of many  countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
(SSA)  deteriorated  significantly. The  growth rate of gross domestic  product  declined,  while inflation  and
unemployment  rates increased rapidly.  Over time, these economies  became more unstable and less
resilient to internal and external  shocks.  In many cases, the economic  decline was the result of poor
economic  management. For example, in some countries, fiscal and monetary policies allowed large
government deficits to accumulate  and continue, even in the face of declining government  revenues,
leading to excessive  government  borrowing,  high rates of interest and accelerating  inflation. Domestic
price controls were introduced to  curb inflation, fuelling the expansion of black markets.  Highly
interventionist  trade and exchange  rate policies  distorted  the terms of trade  between  traded and non-traded
goods.
Over the past several  years, many SSA  countries  have introduced  structural  adjustment  programs
(SAPs) aimed at restoring  economic  growth and stability. These programs have included  major policy
and institutional reforms designed  to  improve economic  efficiency by imposing fiscal and monetary
discipline, liberalizing markets, and  removing price controls (especially in  foreign exchange and
commodity markets).  One of the key objectives  of these reforms was to  create an economic and
institutional  environment  in which the private sector could  develop and flourish.
Exports of primary commodities  such as cocoa and coffee play a key role in many of the
economies  of SSA, often providing the major source of foreign exchange, government revenues, and
employment. Commonly,  the domestic  markets for these commodities  are subject  to strict government
controls  (often  implemented  through  government-owned  marketing  boards)  over many of the production,
marketing, and exporting activities. As part of the SAP, some SSA countries introduced  measures  to
liberalize their  commodity export markets.  Policy changes have included the removal of  trade
restrictions, price controls, and export taxes, and in some countries  the state-owned  marketing  boards
have been abolished.
* The authors wish to thank Ron Duncan, Claude Carlier, Lawrence Hinkle, Arvind Panagariya,
Maurice Schiff, and Vikram  Nehru for helpful comments  and suggestions.
1In addition  to the policy  changes  directed  specifically  to the commodity  sectors, general economic
policies have had a major impact on the production  and export of these commodities. For example,
exchange  rate adjustments  have  typically  improved  the competitiveness  of SSA commodities  in production
vis-a-vis other producing  countries. Also, measures  to control inflation  have lowered the costs of labor
and other inputs, while credit market liberalization  has increased the availability  of loans and lowered
interest rates.  These changes  have lowered  the costs of producing  and marketing  expsrt commodities,
provi;k!ng  producers and traders with greater incentives  to produce and export.
1.2.  Qbjectives  of the Study
These policy changes, however, have led to concern about their impact on world prices of
commodities  such as cocoa  and coffee  and, in turn, on the countries  exporting  them. The policy changes
have,  in  the  main, encouraged production and  exports of  commodities and  likely led to  lower
inte! -tional commodity  prices than would have otherwise  occurred. But this is only part of the story.
:.ow that the policy reforms have been underway for several years in some important SSA
producers, it is timely  to assess what has been  the impact  of the SAPs  and other policy changes  on export
commodity  sectors in SSA and on world commodity  markets. We chose one commodity,  cocoa, which
is an important export commodity  for several SSA countries, some of which hold large shares of the
world market.  Cocoa production in SSA is concentrated  in a few countries-namely Cote d'Ivoire,
Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon which together produce about 50% of  world output (other major
producers are Malaysia  and Brazil). During the 1980s,  structural adjustment  programs in all four West
African  cocoa  producers included  reforms in their cocoa  sectors. However,  the reforms in Cote  d'Ivoire
and Cameroon  came into effect in the late 1980s  and their impacts are yet to take full effect.
The objective of the study was to evaluate how the SAPs have affected  the welfare of cocoa
producers and government revenues in each of the four major cocoa producing countries during the
1980s. To meet this objective, an evaluation  was made of how past policies have affected  certain key
variables, including  cocoa  production,  domestic  cocoa  prices,  marketing  costs, and government  revenues.
The impact  of the SAPs on the world cocoa market was analyzed  by determining  what world prices and
production  would ha  ve been if no SAP had been introduced,  and how producer  and government  welfare
would have been affected  in other major cocoa producing  countries.
21.3.  Pevious Studies
The  impact of  expanding the  commodity exports of  developing countries has  received
considerable  attention  in the literature. An argument  which has received  a great deal of attention  since
the 1950s -ecame  known  as the "export  pessimism"  hypothesis  (Prebisch, 1950). This was based on the
fact that developing countries concentrated on exporting primary commodities, while industrialized
countries  were the main producers of manufactures. Primary commodity  demand tends to be inelastic
with respect  to income, and therefore, if supply  grows fastur than demand, this leads to lower prices and
deteriorating  net barter terms of trade vis-a-vis manufactires.  Also, primary commodities  tend to be
inelastic with respect to price, so that in the short ttsm higher production and productivity lead to
relatively greater price declines, such that marginal revenues from additional output are negative,
reducing  the welfare  of the country increasing  production  as well as of other producing  countries. The
policy implication  of this logical  sequence  is that developing  countries  ought to constrain  production  and
diversify  out of primary commodities.
In a recent study, Panagariya  and Schiff (1990) addressed  the case of export pessimism  for the
cocoa exports of Africa.  Using a game theory approach, they estimated tax rates for Cote d'Ivoire,
Ghana, Cameroon  and Nigeria, as well as for other major non-African  cocoa producers. For each, they
estimated "myopic"  tax rates (profit-maximizing  tax rates under the assumption  that the rates of other
countries  are held fixed at their actual levels), and Nash equilibrium  tax rates (allowing  other countries
to adjust  their taxes optimally). These were compared  with actual  tax rates.  It was found that, with the
exception  of Cote d'Ivoire, actual tax rates were substantially  higher than both the myopic  and Nash  tax
rates. For example, the actual tax rate for Ghanian  cocoa exports in 1982  was 70%, while the myopic
and Nash tax rates were estimated  to be about  20%.
Their model was simulated  to assess the impact of a  100,000 tons increase in production in
Ghana. The expansion  led to a world price decline  of 3.7%, and income losses (defined  as the sum of
tax revenue and producer  surplus)  of 8.0%, 12.3% and 5.7% for Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon  and Nigeria,
respectively. These losses were almost exactly offset by gains in Ghana.  In another simulation,  the
export tax of Cote d'Ivoire was eliminated  altogether, while keeping constant the tax rates in other
producing  countries. The effect was to increase  production  in Cote d'Ivoire by 26.3%, leading to an 8%
fall in the world cocoa  p.'._e and to lower profits in all countries, including  Cote d'Ivoire.  The authors
concluded  that ia providing  policy advice and support of investment  projects in the case of commodities
such as cocoa, the donor community  should take into account the effects on and possible reactions  of
3other producing  countries. They concluded  that increased productivity  would increase profits in those
countries, but other owuntries  would  lose.  However, as a who!e, African countries  would gain because
gains would dominata  the losses.
In an earlier study, Godfrey (1984)  took issue with the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981)  which
stated that "Africa's share of world trade in most commodities  could be increased  with relatively  small
effects  on prices" (jV.23).  Godfrey  tested  this hypothtvis  by comparing  the SSA  countries' share of world
exports with the world price elasticity  of demand.  He observed that if the latter exceeded  the former,
then marginal reveilues  from the expansion  of output and exports were positive.  Using data for 1982,
it was shown that the share of world exports exceeded  the elasticity  of demand  in the cases of coffee and
cocoa.  A 1% increase in coffee  exports led to a 1.14% decline in world price, while for cocoa, a 1%
increase in exports led to a 2.17% fall in world price.  Therefure, an expansion  of coffee and cocoa
exports would lead to a decline in SSA countries' export revenues. Sugar and tea were on the margin
in that the wor!d  export  share and demand  elasticity  were of similar magnitude. In the case of groundnut
oil and sisal, demand elasticities  were not available;  however, given the large share of world exports
supplied by SSA countries, it was highly li':_;y that JSA's export shares would exceed the demand
elasticities.  Godfrey concluded that those calling for an expansion  of commodity exports by SSA
countries  should modify  their prescriptions  considerably,  and that greater emphasis  should be placed or
diversification  from commodities  with low income elasticity  to high income elasticity  products.
The main problem with these approaches  is that the models  used do not capture the complexity
of the commodity  markets.  In particular, these analyses  do not consider the dynamics of the supply
response of perennial commodities  which cannot be captured adequately  with a single-valued  supply
elasticity  (Akiyama  and Trivedi, 1987). The approach  taken in this study is to use a large simultaneow-
equation model of the world cocoa market consisting  of mainly three blocks, supply, demand and price
determination. (For a more detailed  description  see Annex II.)  The supply side consists  of production
equations  for Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Brazil, Malaysia,  Ecuador, Indonesia  and the
Rest of the World.  All production equations,  except those for the last three countries, were modeled
using the vintage-capital  approach  (Akiyama  and Trivedi, 1987),  thus capturing  the dynamics  of supply
response  to policy  changes. The demand  block  consists  of demand  equations  for consumption  (grindings)
and for stocks  for the world as a whole. Both are modeled  m the conventional  way. World consumption
is a functior of real prices and real income in consuming  countries and stocks are a function of real
prices and lagged  production  levels. Finally, the real world price for cocoa is determined  by the market
4clearing  identity  using  the Newton  algorithm.
The model  calculates  some  additional  variables. These  are: (i) value  of production,  calculated
as production  times the FOB price; (ii) government  revenue  from the cocoa sector, calculated  as
production  times  the level  of tax (with  the level of tax equal  to the tax rate times  the FOB  price);  (iii)
the producer  surplus,  calculated  as the area between  the marginal  cost curve  and the producer  price
(Akiyama  and  Trivedi,  1992);  and  (iv)  the "total  welfare,"  calculated  as the sum  of government  revenue
and  the producer  surplus.
The results  from the base-line  simulation  were compared  with historical  data  to validate  the
model.  Two sets of validation  statistics  were calculated,  as discussed  in Annex  H.  These cover
important  aspects  of the model's  ability  to plot historical  data and  to respond  to economic  stimuli  in a
manner  consistent  with both economic  theory and empirical  observation. The validation  statistics
calculated  were the Root Mean  Square  Percentage  Error (RMSPE)  and Theil's U-statistic,  and were
based  on a simulation  period  from 1980/81  to 1989/90  (Table  A2.2). From  these  validation  statistics  It
was concluded  that  the model  gives  an accurate  representation  of the world  cocoa  market  and provides
a reliable  tool for policy  analysis  and forecasting.
1.4.  Outline  of the PaE
This  paper  is organized  into  four sections.  In section  two,  the model  simulations  for the impact
of structural  adjustments  in Ghana  and Nigeria  are discussed. In section  three, the model  simulations
for the impact  of alternative  cocoa  export  taxes  and  exchange  rates  in Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Cameroon  are
discussed. These two sets of simulations  evaluate  the impacts  of SAPs on two countries  which
implemented  substantial  policy  changes  (Ghana  and  Nigeria)  and examine  what different  policies  could
have  been  taken  by  two  countries  which  face  enormous  financial  difficulties  in the cocoa  subsectors  (Cote
d'Ivoire and Cameroon).  Finally,  in section  four, conclusions  and recommendations  from  the analysis
are presented.
5II.  inpact of Structural  Adjustments  In Ghlm and Nigeria
2.1.  Intrduct.on
Ghana and N,eria  are the two major cocoa producing  countries in SSA that have implemented
SAPs over a period of several years.  The main focus in thib section is to investigate  how these policy
changes  have affected  the cocoa subsectors  of these couitries and the world market.  The model of the
world cocoa  market was simulated  over the period.  1982/83-1989/90.  The initial simulation  was carried
out with values of the model's exogenous  variables  set at their actual levels.  This (factual)  simulation
provided  base-line  values  of the model's endogenous  variables  frr comparison  with values from counter-
factual  simulations. The three counter-factual  policy  simulations  undertaken  assumed  that: (i) Ghana  and
Nigeria did not undertake  the SAPs (Scenario  I), (ii) Ghana did not undertake the SAP, while Nigeria
did (Scenario II); and (iii) Nigeria did not undertake the SAP, while Ghana did (Scenario  IE).  The
impacts of the SAPs were measured by the differences  between the actual and adjusted values of the
model's endogenous  variables. Historical  values  of some im,-ortant  exogenous  variables are reported in
Table 2.1.  A full discussion  of these is given in Annex I.  The variables of major interest are the
exchange  rates and producer  prices in Ghana  and Nigeria. These can be compared  with the assumptions
made for the counter-factual  scenarios  presented in Table 2.2.
2.2.  Counter-Factual  Simulagg
2.2.1.  AsmDtions
The SAP undertaken  in Ghana involved  adjustme.nts  affecting  the economy  wsR  a whole as well as
policies directly affecting  the cocoa sector.  Therefore, it was necessary to evaluate what the CPI,
exchange  rate, cocoa producer price, and marketing  costs of cocoa would have been in the absence  of
the structural adjustments. Given that the devaluation  of the Cedi started in the fourth quarter of 1983,
assumptions  were made for these variables for the period 1983/84  to  1989i90 (see Table 2.2).  The
equations  used to derive these values are presented  in Table 2.3.
6Table 2.1: Mlodel  Assumptions  For Key Variables, 1982/83-1989/90.  With Structural
Adjustnents in Ghana and Nigeria (Baseline  Scenario)
Variable  1982/83 1983/84 1984/85  1985/86 1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90
C>unBrwsn  -.-- CFAUP/K  KG
CPI" 1 69.31  79.05  81.71  82.77  90.28  100.14  99.08  100.00
Exchange  Rat2J  367.40  422.03  467.73  362.73  310.78  293.97  317.70  286.12
Producer  Price  330.00  370.00  410.00  420.00  420.00  420.00  420.00  250.00
Markading  Cost  76.60  84.80  86.70  89.20  90.10  89.90  68.80  68.80
Explcit Tax  57.00  57.00  57.00  57.00  57.00  58.30  57.00  0.00
Imupoi Tax  116.70  261.50  371.10  348.20  115.70  5.70  -53.20  21.80
Coto  *t'y0ia  - CFAF / KG  -
cPI"  79.80  83.91  85.28  90.80  95.71  99.48  100.37  IO.Q0
Exchange  Rate  367.40  422.03  467.73  362.73  310.78  293.97  317.70  286.12
Producr Price  350.00  37S.00  400.00  400.00  400.00  400.00  400.00  200.00
Marketing  Coat  68.30  74.30  75.40  82.70  83.10  84.90  92.30  92.20
Explck Tax  50.60  80.50  80.50  80.50  100.50  100.50  100.50  50.25
haplicit  Tax  131.50  288.60  370.20  225.10  48.60  -87.60  -174.60  -52.50
glum  - Cedi / KG
ClfPI  14.60  24.36  26.26  31.90  44.37  59.12  73.97  10.00
Exchange  Rate  2.75  29.07  49.77  81.75  129.92  188.73  254.28  313.88
Producer  Prie  12.00  20.00  30.00  56.60  83.33  140.00  165.00  174.40
Maruktdng  Cost  24.17  36.31  47.97  55.21  86.40  138.36  90.67  96.73
mplick  Tax  -30.53  17.23  47.51  69.26  93.03  81.92  123.46  143.92
NiouzA  - Nai  / KG  -
CPI"  24.4?  34.59  38.80  39.67  44.00  57.31  86.37  100.00
Ebxhango  Rate 2 PA  0.75  0.86  1.08  3.89  4.33  6.76  7.83
Produce Price  1.30  1.40  1.50  1.60  6.50  7.50  12.00  9.00
Make1ting  Coda  0.51  0.73  0.81  0.83  0.77  1.00  1.51  1.75
bmplicit  Tax  61.91  -54.58  -26.40  -16.17  -5.13  -19.02  -34.58  -7.76
I/  1989/90  =  100.
2/  Domstic cuoy  per US dollar.
7Table 2.2: Model Assumptions  For Key Variables, 1982/83-1989/90.  Without Structural Adjustment
in Ghana and Nigeria
Variable  1982/83 1983/84  1984/85  1985/86 1986/87  1987/88  1988/89 1989/90
ahmn  --  Cedi / KG  - --
CPI"  9.49  13.28  18.59  26.03  36.44  51.02  71.43  100.00
Exchangc  Rate 2 2.75  3.93  5.46  6.49  8.27  10.79  15.22  20.11
Producer  Price  12.00  10.86  16.11  22.11  27.74  36.26  45.48  57.29
Markding  Cost  24.17  33.84  47.37  66.32  92.85  129.99  181.99  254.78
Nier  -Naim  / KG ----
CPI"  29.71  42.07  47.19  48.23  57.87  69.44  83.33  100.00
Exchange  Rate  0.71  0.75  0.86  1.08  1.18  1.32  1.60  1.81
Ptoducer  Price  1.30  1.40  1.50  1.60  3.06  3.44  3.72  4.03
Maetriing Coats  0.51  0.73  0.81  0.83  1.00  1.20  1.44  1.73
I/  1989/90 =  100.
2/  Domnatic  currency  per US dolar.
For Ghaaa, the consumer  price index was increased  by 40% in each period, equivalent  to the
annual  average increase  in inflation  during  the five year period  prior to 1983/84. The exchange  rate was
estimated assuming purchasing power parity with 1983/84 as the base year.  The Bank's  MUV
(Manufacturer's  Unit Value Index) was used as the measure  of inflation  in the rest-of-the-world. This
mechanism  assumes  that exchange  rates adjust according  to the differential  between  the inflation  rate of
the country and its trading partners.  With the exchange rate adjusting, the purchasing power of the
^urrency  stays the same 1 2. This assumption  assumes  that the currency over-valuation  of 1982/83 was
maintained  throughout  the rest of the 1980s. The exchange  rates  and CPIs are assumed  not to be affected
by the cocoa producer  prices and marketing  costs.
' For example,  if the  rat of inflaion  in Ghana  is 10%  greater  than  in the  red of the  world,  then,  over  the  long
run, the Cedi  will  depreciate  by 10%  against  the  rest of the  world.
2lnitially,  the  exchange  rate  wa estmated  as a logarithmic  function  of the ratio  of Gha's  CPI  and the  MUV
index,  lagged  one  year,  for the  period  1975  to 1981. However,  purchasing  power  parity  was  not  supported  by the
estimated  equation  beause the  coefficient  of the relative  inflation  vaiable  was only  0.45. Using  a coefficient  of
this size  gave  predictions  of the exchange  rate too low to be credible. Therefore,  purchasing  power  paity was
imposed  by constrining  the  coefficient  of the relative  inflation  variable  to be equal  to unity  and the  constant  term
of the equation set to zero.  This gave exchag  rte  assumptions  that were much more credible, as reported  in
Table  2.2.Table 2.3: Equations  l;a.d to Estimate Consumer  Price Index, Exchange  Rate, Producer Price,
and Marketing  Cost for Ghana and Nigeria, Without Structural Adjustment
Consumer Pric  Index
Ghan:  CP1, =  1.4 * CPL.,
Nigoei:  CPI, =  1.2 * CPI.,
Ghana:  BR, = ER,m  * EXP( LN(CPI, / CPIz,")  - LN(MUV, / MUVu3)  )
Nigena:  ER, = ER.f  * EXP( LN(CPI, / CPIs6)  - LN(M.JV, / MUV,.jf)
Producer Price of Coco
Ghan:  LN PP,  - -3.72  + 0.41  * LN (WP,. / ER,.,) + 0.56 * LN (CPI,.1)
(5.06)  f@)
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.99  DW:  1.22  Period of Pit: 1966481
Nigeria:  LN PP, = 4.59  + 0.37  * LN (W/P,. I ER,,) + 0.74 * LN (CPIj,)
(3.38)  (7.77)
Adjuded R-Squared: 0.96  DW: 0.76  Period of Fit:  1966-85
(a*dmtna  Cos
Ghana:  M_  = MCv,  * (CPI, / CPI,.)
Nigenia:  MC, = MCn,  * (CPI, / CP4m,j)
Whoer:  CPI,  =  Consumer Price Index at time t,
ER,  =  Exchange Rate at tim  t,
MUV,  =  Manufcturers  Unit Vablu Index at time t,
PP,  =  Produea  Price of Cooa  in Ghana at time t,
WP,  - World Price of Cocoa at time t,
MC,  =  M  ting Cost at tim  t,
EXP  =  Indicates eponential  _tnsfonned,
LN  =  Indicatw logarhmic  transformed.
The cocoa producer price had been set by the government  before the SAPs were implemented.
A hypothesis that the international  cocoa price and CPI influenced  the government's cocoa pricing
policies was tested using regression analysis. The results of the analysis  show that the coefficients  on
the independent  variables  are statistically  highly significant  and indicate  that domestic  price changes  were
9influenced  in fairly equal proportions  by changes  in international  cocoa  prices and by general domestic
price increases-with the latter reflecting  costs of production. The domestic producer prices prevailing
in the absence  of structural adjustment  were derived from an equation including  the actual world price
of cocoa and the estimated exchange rate and CPI derived from the respective equations.  Finally,
marketing  costs for the period 1983/841989/90  were assumed  to be equal to their 1982/83  level in real
terms, using the estimated  CPI as the deflator. 3
In the case of Nigeria, it was assumed  that the SAP came into effect during 1986/87, although
some policy changes  were made slightly earlier.  Between  1986/87 and 1989/90  the CPI was assumed
to increase annually by 20%, equivalent  to  the average annual inflation rate between 1981/82 and
1985/86  (the period prior to the SAP), while the exchange  rate was determined  by assuming  purchasing
power parity. The producer  price of cocoa  was estimated  using the equation  reported in Table 2.3.  The
results show that 96% of variations in the domestic producer price of cocoa can be explained  by the
previous year's international  cocoa price, converted  into Naira, and the previous year's CPI. Marketing
costs were assumed  to remain at the 1985/86  level in real terms for the 1986/87-1989/90  period, and
were converted  into nominal  terms using the estimated  CPI.
2.2.2.  Impact of Structural Adjustment  Progrm  on the World Cocoa Mare
'Me impacts of the SAPs in Ghana and Nigeria  on key variables of the world cocoa market are
sho -n in Table 2.4.  Reported  are the values for 1989/90  and cumulative  effects  for the period 1982/83-
1989/90. Because  impacts  of policy changes  on perennials  take a number  of years before they become
evident, data for the last year for which we have concrete  data, 1989/90,  are shown to indicate  the long-
term effects of the policy changes. A comparison  is made  between  the actual  values and the results from
the three counter-factual  scenarios.
3  Notice that  the  implicit  taxes  on producers  ae  not reported  in Table  2.2. This  is because  they  bocome  an
endogenow  variable  in the  model  simuations,  since  th  tax  is defined  as the  difference  between  the  FOB  value  (i.e.,
the  sum  of the  produoer  price,  explicit  taxes,  and  maketing  costs)  and  the  acul  cost  at the  port. The  a  FOB
price  for cocoa  in atch of these  counties  is closdy  related  to the  world  cocoa  price  which  in tum  has  been  affcte
by the  structural  adjusdmet  piogmms. Therefore,  in the counter-facta  simulation,  the actual  cost at tho port in
each  country  is linked  to the  world  coco price  tuough a price  linkage  equation.  The  eated  acua FOB  price
is then  combined  with  the  adjusted  cost  at the  port  (i.e., adjused  for  changes  in the  producr price,  marketing  costs,
and explicit  tax)  to give  the implicit  tax.
10Table 2.4: Impact of Structural Adjustments  in Ghana and Nigeria on the World Cocoa  Market
Scenarios  World  Real  Real Value of  World  World
on SAPs  Production  Price  Production  Stocks  Grindings
('000 tons)  (1984/85  C/kg)  (million  1984/85  $)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)
Both.  1989/90  2,435.0  86.01  2,094.3  1,473.0  2,193.0
Factual 21
Cumulativel"  16,145.0  16S.5021  25,362.4  6,729.0  15,296.0
Neither.  1989/90  2,279.1  106.93  2,437.1  1,273.7  2,094.6
Scenario  I4.
Cumwulative"  15,604.3  179.30'  26,978.2  6,166.9  14,954.9
Nigeria Only.  1989/90  2,308.5  102.71  2,371.1  1,311.0  2,112.4
Scenaio  II".
Cumulative"  15,684.4  178.002'  26,828.4  6,242.1  14,997.7
Ghana  Only.  1989/90  2,404.4  89.36  2,148.5  1,431.9  2,175.4
Scenario  IIIP.
Cumulative'  16,055.2  166.9421  25,531.7  6,638.7  15,247.2
I/  Cwledve  for d  peroi  198213-1989/90.
2/  Aveng  1982193-1989/90.
3/  Faal.  Stural  Adjusmen  by both Ghana and Nigeria.
4/  Scemdo l.  No Structur  Adjuatmet by Ghan or Nigeria.
S/  Scenario  n. Stucura Adjutmnt  by N-ra,  no Suutnl  A4justmnt by Gham.
6/  Scenaro m. Strut  Adjus  by Ghan,  no Sucturl  Adjustmnt by Ngerna.
In 1989/90, actual world production was 2.43 millions tons.  If Ghana and Nigeria had not
undertaken structural adjustment  programs, production  would  have been 2.28 million tons, 6% lower.
The model generates  this reduction in production  because  producer prices in Ghana and Nigeria would
have been considerably  lower if the policy changes  had not taken place (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2) and
hence production  in these  two countries  would  have  been lower. Because  of the lower world production,
the real world price of cocoa  in terms of 1984/85  US dollars  would  have been about 1070/kg  in 1989/90,
compared  to the actual price of only 86c/kg, a difference  of about 24%.  Although  production  is lower,
due to the inelasticity  of world  demand, the increase  in world  price in the counter-factual  scenario  is such
11that the value of world production  is about 17% higher In 1989/90. The effect of lower production  and
higher prices causes world stock levels and world grindings to  be reduced by  13.5% and 4.5%,
respectively.
The cumulative  effect of the SAP in Ghana and Nigeria over the period 1982/83-1989/90  is for
world production to have been 3.5% higher, world stocks to be 9% higher, and world grindings to
increase  by 2.3%.  On average  over this period  the real world  price of cocoa would  have been about  89%
higher if Ghana and Nigeria  had not made  the structural adjustments. Table 2.4 also shows  that because
of the structural adjustments  in the two countries,  the value of world cocoa production  was reduced by
6% or US$1.6 billion in real terms over the period 1982/83-1989/90  because  of the lower world price.
Also, the level of production  in the rest-of-the-world  (i.e., the world excluding  Ghana and Nigeria) was
4% less while  the value of production  in the rest-of-the-world  was 11% or US$2.2 billion lower.
In Table 2.4 are also reported  the results of simulation  of the effects of structural adjustment  by
Nigeria  but not by Ghana  (scenario  II), and the case  of structural  adjustment  by Ghana  but not by Nigeria
(scenario  IIl).  The impacts  of these counter-factual  scenarios  on the world cocoa market lie within  the
ranges of the impacts  for the factual  case and scenario  I (no structural  adjustment  by Ghana and Nigeria).
Notice that the impacts  are larger for the case where only Ghana  undertakes  structural adjustment. This
is because  Ghana is a larger producer  of cocoa  than Nigeria  and began its structural adjustment  program
earlier.
2.2.3.  Imnact of Structural Adjustment  Programs  in Ghana and Nigeria on Ghana's Cocoa Sector
The impacts of structural  adjustment  by Ghana and Nigeria  on Ghana's cocoa  sector as measured
in terms of producer surplus, government  revenues, level of production, and value of production are
reported in Table 2.5.  The actual  Ghanaian  producer  surplus  for 1989/90  was US$17  million, compared
to only US$5.4 million  in the scenario  where Ghana  and Nigeria  do not undertake  structural adjustment
programs. This is because two components  of the producer  surplus calculation-the producer  price and
the level of production-are lower in the counter-factual  case. Government  revenue  was affected  greatly
by the structural adjustment  programs. For 1989/90, actual government  revenue was US$81.8 million,
compared  to government  expenditures  (i.e., negative  revenues)  of US$88.2  million  if Ghana and Nigeria
had not made structural adjustments. Although  the world price of cocoa would have been much  higher
12(implying  a higher  FOB price  and  higher  tax revenue)  if structural  adjustment  had not taken  place,  the
cedi/US$  exchange  rate would  have  been  much  lower,  resulting  in a very low FOB  price of cocoa  in
terms  of cedi.
Table  2.5: Impact  of Structural  Adjustment  in Ghana  and Nigeria  on Ghana
Scenarios  Producer  Government  Joint  Value  of  Production
on SAPs  Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
(1984/85  US$mill.)  ('O00tons)
Both.  1989/90  17.0  81.8  98.8  298.1  295.0
Factual 2'.
Cumulative"'  817.0  -763.7  53.3  3,165.8  1,742.0
Neither.  1989/90  5.4  -88.2  -82.8  200.9  159.9
Scenario  I'.
Cumulative 1'  563.5  -2,296.8  -1,733.3  2,575.4  1,236.7
Nigeria  Only.  1989/90  5.4  -112.8  -107.4  193.0  159.9
Scenario 411.
Cumulative"  563.5  -2,474.8  -1,911.3  2,556.8  1,236.7
Ghana  Only.  1989/90  17.0  97.0  114.0  309.7  295.0
Scenario  111s.
Cumulative"'  817.0  -735.9  81.1  3,199.8  1,742.0
1/  Cumulaive fbr the pefiod 1982/83-1989/90.
V  Factual. Strnul  Adjutment by both Ghm  aN Nia.
3/  Scenaio 1. No Stnucurl Adjuslment  by Ghana  or Niea.
4/  Senaro  f.  Strctal  Adjustmen  by Nipeia, no  mtuctl  Adjustmet  by Ghn.
s/  Sceno  m. Stuctal  Adjustm  by Ghana,  no Stnucul  Adjudsme by Nigria.
Although  the producer  price  would  have  been  lower  without  the structural  adjustment,  the FOB
price  would  have  been  even  lower  because  of the exchange  rate  effect. As  a result,  the  tax per  ton  would
13have been negative  for much  of the 1980s  if Ghana had not adjusted.' In fact, to maintain  the producer
price, the government  would  have had to subsidize  the cocoa  sector by US$88.2  million, and by as much
as US$2.3 billion  over the period 1982183-1989/90.  Joint income  realized  fo: 1989/90,  given  by the sum
of producer surplus and government  revenue was US$98.8 million, compared  with a joint income loss
of US$82.8 million  if no structural  adjustment  had taken  place.  Production  in Ghana was 295,000 tons
in 1989/90;  if no adjustment  had taken place it would  have bean about  45% lower at 160,000  tons. The
value of production is also lower in the counter-factual  simulatLrn  because of the lower production,
despite an increase  in the world cocoa  price.
Levels of some key variables for 1982/83-1989/90  are reported in Table 2.6.5  Of particular
importance is to compare the producer price and FOB price with and without structural adjustment
programs. Without the devaluation  of the exchange  rate, the FOB price of cocoa in Ghana would have
been about 29 cedi/kg in nominal terms in  1989/90, compared to 415 cedi/kg with the programs.
Comparing  these with the producer price shows that in the absence  of structural adjustment  there would
have been  a considerable  subsidy  to producers. For example,  in 1989/90,  it is estimated  that the producer
price of cocoa would have been 57.3 cedi/kg, appropximately  one-half  of the FOB price in that year.
These  results indicate  that the exchange  rate assumptions  are crucial  to certain  results. Recall  that
the exchange rate does not affect the producer price and producer surplus.  However, changes in the
exchange  rate will affect the export  tax and government  revenue. To test the sensitivity  of the results to
the exchange  rate assumptions  an analysis  was undertaken  with the exchange  rate set at double the level
assumed in the base case (e.g., in 1989/90  the assumed  exchange  rate was 40 cedi/US$  instead of 20
cedi/US$). In this scenario,  it was found  that the government  revenue and export  tax were 11% to 12%
higher than in the base scenario.  Therefore, the result that if the SAP had not been implemented  in
Ghana the government  would have incurred large revenue  losses is robust with respect to the exchange
rate assumption.
I  The tax per ton is calculated  as the FOB price less the producer price less marketing  costs (see Table A2.1
in Annex  II).
5These  tables combine  data from Tables 2.1. 2.2, and Al.l-Al.3.
14Table 2.6: Key Variables  for Ghana, 1982/83-1989/90.  With and Without Structural
Adjustments  in Ghana and Nigeria
Variable  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90
Producer Princ (nomial  cedikr)
With  12.0  20.0  30.0  56.6  83.3  140.0  165.0  174.4
Wthout  12.0  10.9  16.1  22.1  27.7  36.3  45.5  57.3
M  i  C  (nomin  codkal
With  24.2  36.3  48.0  55.2  86.4  138.4  90.7  96.7
Wsthout  24.2  33.8  47.4  66.3  92.9  130.0  182.0  254.8
Cost at Port (nominal cedi/kn)
With  36.2  56.3  78.0  111.8  169.7  278.4  255.7  271.1
Wthout  36.2  44.7  63.5  88.4  120.6  166.2  227.5  312.1
FOB Price (nominal cedi/kY
With  5.6  73.5  125.3  181.1  262.8  360.3  379.2  415.0
WithOut  5.4  8.9  12.3  13.9  16.7  17.7  20.6  28.8
JILiWik  TAX
With  -546.4  23.4  37.7  38.3  35.4  22.7  32.6  34.7
-Withbo  -573.4  -401.6  -417.2  -536.0  -620.3  -840.  -'102.1  -982.8
Production ('000 t
With  225.0  178.0  159.0  175.0  219.0  228.0  188.0  300.0
Without  183.0  152.0  131.9  136.0  169.6  119.8  184.4  159.9
The impact  on producer  surplus  and production  in scenario  E  is the same  as in scenario  I, because
the production  and producer  price levels  are the same  in each. The government  revenues  are even more
negative  and the value of production  is lower in scenario  II, because  of the reduction in the world price
of cocoa (see Table 2.4).  If Nigeria  had not had a structural  adjustment  program (scenario  m), producer
surplus and production would not have been affected, while government revenues and the value of
production would have been higher because  of the higher world cocoa price.  These simulations  show
that Ghana benefitted  greatly in terms of the country's welfare  from the structural adjustment,  especially
compared  with the case where Nigeria implemented  the adjustment  and Ghana did not.
152.2.4.  Impact of Structural  Adjustment  Programs in Ghana and Nigeria on Nigeria
The impacts  of structural adjustment  programs by Ghana and Nigeria  on Nigeria's cocoa sector
are reported in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.  With Nigeria  undertaking  a structural adjustment  program, producer
surplus and the level of production  in Nigeria  were US$35.9  million  and 160,000  tons, respectively,  in
1989/90  (see Table 2.7).  If adjustment  had not occurred,  producer  surplus  would  have  been only US$6.3
million and production  only 129,300  tons, because  the producer  price of cocoa would have been lower
(see Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  These results apply  whether  or not Ghana undertakes  an adjustnent program.
Table 2.7: Impact of Structural  Adjustment  in Ghana and Nigeria  on Nigeria
Scenados  Produoer  Government  Joint  Value of  Producdon
on SAPs  Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Producdon
(1984/85 USS mill.)  ('000 tons)
Both.  1989/90  35.9  0.0  35.9  147.2  160.0
Factual2'.
Cumunlaive'  417.4  -334.5  82.9  1,858.0  1,082.0
Neither.  1989/90  6.3  93.7  100.0  148.0  129.3
scenario  1t.
Cumulative"  259.2  145.2  404.4  1,902.6  995.7
Nigrak Only.  1989/90  35.9  0.0  35.9  175.8  160.0
Seonario II".
Cumuliative"  417.4  -322.6  94.8  1,998.6  1,082.0
Ghana Only.  1989/90  6.3  72.1  78.4  123.6  129.3
Scenario  ml.
Cumulativey  259.2  31.8  291.0  1,777.8  995.7
1/  Cmulav  fir the  peiod 1982/83-1989/90.
2/  Faual.  Strual  A4_dme  by  oth  hana  ad  Nea.
3/  Sceando  L  No  Stucua  Adjutmes  by Ohahn  or Nigea.
4/  Sconaio  EL Stucural Adjustmen  by Niger, no Strucur  Adjusmens  by Ghana.
S/  Scenaio  DL Stnutucand  Adjudism by GOhna,  no  Stuctud Adjutmen  by  Nigedi.
16However, if Nigeria  had not introduced  a structural  adjustment  program, its government  revenues  would
have been higher because of a tax on exports. This is because  the world price would have been higher
and the producer  price would have been lower, while  the exchange  rate adjustment  would  not have been
sufficiently  strong to counteract  these effects, as was the case for Ghana (see Table 2.8).  This gives the
rather anomalous  result that Nigeria would  have been better off if it had not had a structural  adjustment
program.
Table 2.8: Key Variables  for Nigeria, 19R2/83-1989/90.  With and Without
Structural Adjustments  in Ghana and Nigeria
Vaiable  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90
Prducer  Pince (nominal nuai1a&l
With  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6  6.5  7.5  12.0  9.0
Without  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6  3.1  3.4  3.7  4.0
MCo  (  k
With  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.5  1.7
Without  0.5  0.7  0.8  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.7
Cot  at Port (nominal naiza}
With  1.8  2.1  2.3  2.4  6.9  7.1  10.0  10.0
Withou  1.8  2.1  2.3  2.4  4.1  4.6  5.2  5.8
FOB  Pnco (nominal nairak9@
With  1.1  1.4  1.8  2.1  6.9  7.4  10.0  10.0
Wihout  1.1  1.4  1.9  2.3  7.7  8.1  12.0  12.4
EntEck  TAx (%I
With  -61.6  -54.3  -26.2  -16.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Wihout  -63.2  -54.0  -18.9  -3.5  47.0  42.9  57.2  53.6
Pmducto  ('000 twu
With  156.0  115.0  151.0  110.0  80.0  150.0  160.0  160.0
Wihout  156.0  115.0  151.0  110.8  69.2  129.0  135.5  129.3
17This result is due to a particular  characteristic  of perennial  crop supply-it takes several years for
perennials  to start producing  after planting and it also takes several years before production  declines in
a significant  way following  a price decline. An illustrative  example  is Ghana's production  in the 1970s.
Although  real producer prices were reduced  sharply during the late 1960s,  a deterioration  in production
did not become evident until the late 1970s.  Higher taxes can be imposed on perennials without a
significant  decline in production  for a few years and this increases  government  revenue and producer
surplus  during the period. Effectively,  this is equivalent  to "consuming"  the past investments  on cocoa.
In the Nigerian scenario considered here, the sum of government revenue and producer surplus is
increased by the high export taxes.  However, were this policy of high export taxes to  continue,
production would decline  to considerably  less than 100,000  tons by the mid-1990s. Conversely,  under
the SAP its production should increase  beyond 1989/90. Indeed, actual cocoa production  for 1990/91
is reported  to be 170,000  tons. Thus, if the accumulated  government  revenue and producer surplus  were
calculated  up to the mid-1990s,  it would be lower in the case where there was no structural adjustment.
2.2.5.  Impact of Structural  Adjustment  Programs in Ghana and Nigeria on Cameroon
The impacts  of structural  adjustment  programs  by Ghana and Nigeria  on Cameroon's  cocoa sector
are reported in Table 2.9.  If Ghana and Nigeria  had not undertaken  structural adjustment  programs  the
value of production would have been US$150.1 million in 1989/90, compared to the actual value of
US$120.7 million-a decrease  of almost  20%. Government  revenue  would  also have  beer higher  because
the higher world price would have caused  the tax on exports to be greater.  If either Ghana or Nigeria
had not undertaken  the adjustments,  Cameroon  would  have been better off-although by less than if both
had not adjusted.
2.2.6.  Imnact of Structural Adjustment  Program  in Ghana and Nigeria  on Cote d'Ivoire
The impacts of the structural adjustment  programs in Ghana and Nigeria on Cote d'Ivoire are
shown in Table 2.10.  As in the case of Cameroon,  it was assumed  that no macro-economic  adjustments
were made by Cote  d'Ivoire itself, and that reforms  to its cocoa  sector  were made late in the 1980s. The
results show that Cote d'Ivoire was made worse off by the structural adjustment  programs in Ghana and
Nigeria, through the impact of a lower world cocoa price.  For example, government revenue for
1989/90  was actually  US$51.0 million  and the  value of cocoa  production  US$653.5  million, respectively.
If Ghana and Nigeria  had not undertaken  structural adjustment  programs, it is estimated  that these would
have been US$132.1 million and US$812.5  million, respectively.
isTable  2.9: Impact  of Structural  Adjustments  in Ghana  and Nigeria  on Cameroon
Scenarios  Producer  Govermment  Joint  Value  of  Production
onSAPs  Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
-(1984/8  5 constant  US$  mll.)  ('O00tons)
Both.  1989/90  51.3  7.4  58.7  120.7  125.0
Factual.
Cumulative"'  594.2  504.6  1,098.8  1,744.3  955.0
Neither.  1989/90  51.3  21.5  72.8  150.1  125.0
Scenario  P.
Cumulative 1'  594.2  614.7  1,208.9  1,896.9  955.0
Nigeria  Only.  1989/90  51.3  18.6  69.9  144.2  125.0
Scenario  H".
Cumulativeu  594.2  606.6  1,200.8  1,882.3  955.0
Ghana  Only.  1989/90  51.3  8.5  59.8  125.4  125.0
Scenario  Mv.
Cumulativelu  594.2  514.7  1,108.9  1,760.6  955.0
1/  Cumulave for the perod 1932/83-1989/90.
V2/ Fctud.  Stnrutu  Adjwtet  by Both  Ghana nd  Ngea.
3/  Scenario  L  No Srucur  Adjustment  by Gha,.  .ir Nigei.
4/  SCenrUio  H.  Suctua  Adjustment  by Nigr,  no Stucturl  Adjudment  by Ghna.
S/  Scenario  m. Stucur  Adjustment  by Ghua,  no Stuctrl  Adjusten  by Nieria.
19Table 2.10: Impact of Structural Adjustments  in Ghana and Nigeria on Cote d'Ivoire
Scenarios  Producer  Government  Joint  Value  of  Production
on SAPs  Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  ProductioR
- (1984/85  constantUS$mmil.)  ('00tons)
Both.  1989/90  148.7  51.0  199.7  653.5  710.0
Factual2'.
Cumulative" 2,900.3  1,908.3  4,808.6  7,757.3  4,707.0
Neither.  1989/90  148 7  132.1  280.8  812.5  710.0
Scenario 13'.
Cumulative"  2,900.3  2,612.5  5,512.8  8,537.3  4,707.0
Nigeria Only.  1989/90  148.7  115.9  264.6  780.4  710.0
Scenario  II.
Cumulative"  2,900.3  2,532.6  5,432.9  8,453.1  4,707.0
Ghana Only.  1989/90  148.7  64.1  212.8  679.0  710.0
Scenario MEs.
Cumulative"' 2,900.3  1,987.9  4,888.2  7,843.6  4,707.0
i/  Cumulative  for  bhe  pedod 1982V83-1989/90.
2/  Factual. S9uctuwa  Adjustment  by Both Ghan and  Nigeria.
3/  Scenario  1. No Stizeuual Adjudment  by Ghan or Nieria.
4/  Scenario . Stucturl Adjusent  by Nigeria, no Stzutbl  AdjuwAa  by Ghan.
S/  Scenaro  m. Stucura Adjustm  by Ghana,  no Stctural Adjustment  by Nigeria.
2.2.7.  Impact of Structural  Adjustment  P  sin  Ghana and Nigera on the Combined  Cocoa  Sectors
of Ghana, Nigeria. Cameroon  and Cote d'Ivoire
The combined  impacts  of the structural adjustment  programs carried out by Ghana and Nigeria
on the four major cocoa  producers  in SSA are reported  in Table 2.11. Over the period 1982/83-1989/90,
the level of cocoa production in these four countries was 7% higher as a result of the adjustment
programs.  However, because of the impact of the increased production on the world price, the
accumulated  value of production  was reduced  by 3%.  The other important  effect is on producer  surplus
and government  revenues,  which increased 12% as a result of the SAPs because  of the higher producer
surplus in Ghana and Nigeria.  However, the four govermments  received lower revenues  because the
world price was less following  the adjustment  programs.
20Table  2.11:  Impact  of Structural  Adjustment  Progrms in Ghana  and  Nigeria  on Cameroon,
Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ghana,  and Nigeria  Combined
Scenarios  Producer  Government  Joint  Value  of  Production
on SAPs  Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
(1984/85  constantUS$mill.)  ('OO0tons)
Both.  1989/90  252.9  140.2  393.1  1,219.5  1,290.0
Factual".
Cumulative" 4,728.7  1,314.7  6,043.6  14,525.4  8,486.0
Neither.  1989/90  211.7  159.1  370.8  1,311.5  1,124.2
Scenario  P'.
Cumulative" 4,317.2  1,075.6  5,392.8  14,912.2  7,894.4
Nigeria  Only.  1989/90  241.3  21.7  263.0  1,293.4  1,154.9
Scenario o'.
Cumulative"'  4,475.4  341.8  4,817.2  14,890.8  7,980.7
Ghana  Only.  1989/90  223.3  _41.7  465.0  1,237.7  1,259.3
Scenario  Es.
Cumulative 1'  4,570.7  1,798.5  6,369.2  14,581.8  8,399.7
1/  Cwmdative  for the period 1982/83-1989/90.
21  Facul.  Stucunr  Adjustmed by Both  Ohman  d Nigeria.
3/  Scenario  1.  No Stuctnl  Adjustment  by Ghmn or Nigeia.
4/  Scenario  H.  Stucural Adjument by Nipgria,  no Stmoutl  Adjustment  by Ghan.
S/  Sc¢enio  m. Suual  Adjusmnt  by Ghana,  no Structural  Adjusment by Nigeria.
21m.  Impact  of Alternatve Export Tax and Exchange Rate Poides  by Cote d'Ivolre and Cameroon
3.1.  Intdn
While Ghana and Nigeria  implemented  significant  policy changes  to make  their cocoa subsectors
competitive  in the  1980s, the other two major SSA cocoa producing countries, Cote d'Ivoire and
Cameroon, suffered large government  deficits due to their fixed producer price policy, appreciation  of
the CFA, and the decline  of world cocoa prices. This led to decisions  to reduce cocoa  producer prices
by one-half in  1990, which caused a sharp reduction in farmers' income in these countries.  Cocoa
production in Cote d'Ivoire increased  sharply over the past decade  or so; from 230,000 tons in 1972  to
820,000 tons in  1989-an annual average growth rate of 7.7%.6  To put this in perspective, the
incremental  production of Cote d'Ivoire of 480,000 tons was approximately  equal to the sum of the
incremental production of Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia-the only other major cocoa producing
countries  to experience  significant  expansion  in cocoa  production  during the 1977-90  period. 7 This rapid
expansion  in production  by Cote d'Ivoire was a major factor contributing  to the decline  of world cocoa
pricts during the late 1980s. Here, we examine  what differences  there would have been If Cameroon
and Cote d'Ivoire had pursued different export  tax and exchange  rate policies.
3.2.  A
In order to examine  the impact  of Cote d'Ivoire's policies  on its cocoa  production,  it is necessary
to look at its producer tax and price policies during the 1970s  and early-l9&Os  period.  These are
discussed in detail in  Annex I.  These issues can be examined using a  framework developed for
estimating  the optimal  export  tax on perennial  crops in countries  holding  large  shares of the world  market
(see Akiyama, 1992).  The rationale of an export tax in such cases is to put a wedge between world
prices and producer  prices so as to maximize  the country's welfare. The optimal  tax makes  the farmers'
expected  marginal revenues  equal to the country's marginal  revenues. A formula  for the optimal  tax is
(Akiyama, 1992,  eq.19, p.14):
6 For  1991/92,  cocoa  production  in Cote  d'Ivoire  is fioreast  to be 770,000tons.
7fBetween  1977  and  1990  Brazil  increased  its production  from  240,000  tons  to 370,000  tons,  Malaysia's  rose
from  21,000 tons  to 240,000 tons, and Indonesia's  rose  firom  3,000 tons  to 120,000  tons.
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Where:
TXR,  =  optimal  tax rate at time  zero;
Bi  =  discount  factor equal to 1/(1 +  r)i,
r  =  rate of discount;
Y,  =  yield at time i;
E*9  (WP 1)  =  expectations  of the world  price  (WP)  held  at time i by the government;
EJ (WP 1)  =  expectations  of the world  price  held  at time  i by farmers;
SH,  =  the country's  share  of the world  market  at time  i; and
ei  =  sum of the world demand elasticity and the supply elasticity of the rest of the
world.
As seen  from  the formula,  the optimal  tax rate  depends  critically  on the assumptions  made  about
government  and farmer  price expectations.  For example,  suppose  farmers  are assumed  to hold naive
expectations  (i.e., their  expected  price  is the  current  price),  and  that  the  government  was able  to forecast
the price  decline  in the 1580s  (0.65  times  the  prevailing  price  during  the late 1970s). Also,  assume  that
Cote d'Ivoire's market  share at time i is 0.31 (its actual  share during  the late,1980s)  and that the
combined  world  demand  elasticity  and medium-term  supply  elasticity  of the rest of the world  is 0.80.
Then,  using  the formula,  the optimal  export  tax  for Cote  d'Ivoire  during  the 1977-83  period  would  have
been  about  60%, almost  double  the actual  rate  in this  period  (about  30%).
If, more  realistically,  farmers  and  government  are assumed  to have  the same  price  expectations,
the  optimal  tax rate  changes  substantially.  In this  case  the price  expectation  terms  in the equation  cancel
out (i.e., E*' (WP) = EJ (WPJ ), and using identical  assumptions  about  other components  of the
formula,  the optimal  rate  becomes  40%.
Three counter-facual  scenarios  were investigated.  First, the model  was run for the 1982/83-
1989/90  period  assuming  that  an export  tax of 60%  had applied  in Cote  d'Ivoire  in the 1978-83  period.
A justification  for the 60%  tax scenario  is that, even  though  farmers  and government  may  have  had  the
same price expectations  during  that period,  the Ivorian  Government  provided  input subsidies  (e.g.,
23fertilizers and spray materials)  to the cocoa sector, giving additional incentives  to producers. 8 In the
model, these subsidies  are not otherwise  taken into account.
The second  scenario  analyzed  was  with the export  tax set at 40% during the 1977-83  period. The
third scenario  is with a 40% export  tax rate and maintaining  the real exchange  rate at its 1985 level after
1985 (its lowest level over the 1980-90  period, see Table Al .1  1), in order to predict what would have
been the combined  effect of using a higher export  tax and CFA real depreciation  after 1985. This case
is of interest  because  the large appreciation  of the French Franc vis-a-vis  the US dollar since 1985  caused
a reduction in the FOB price of cocoa in terms of CFA.  As a result, to maintain  producer prices at the
same level, the government  significantly  reduced  its revenues  drawn from the cocoa sector and provided
ineffective  production  subsidies  (e.g., in 1989)  before halving  the price in 1990.
In all scenarios,  other cocoa producing  countries  were assumed  not to change their export  taxes
in response  to the tax changes  in Cote  d'Ivoire.  Finally, cocoa  producer  prices were assumed  not to have
been changed  by the other three major West  African  cocoa  producers, and therefore  that their production
would not have been affected. 9 The simulation  results are presented  in Tables 3.1-3.6.
A similar exercise  to that applied  to Cote d'Ivoire was applied to Cameroon. The optimal  tax
for Cameroon was determined  using the formula shown above, and assuming (i) that government  and
farmers  have the same price expectations,  (ii) that Cameroon's  world market share at time i is 7.3%, and
(iii) that the elasticity  (eJ)  is 0.8.  This gives an optimal  tax of about  9%.  This tax rate is significantly
lower than the tax rates actually applied during the period of the late  1970s and  1980s  (with the
exception  of 1989),  during which period the rate of cocoa  taxation  in Cameroon  was between 30% and
45%.
In the second Cameroon  scenario, we applied the 9% export tax rate during the period 1977-90
and  assumed  that the CFA remained  at its 1985 real level for the period 1985-1990. As in the case of
"See  'Ivory  Coast  Continues  to Expand  Production",  Foreign  Agrieulture  Circular,  USDA,  January  1980. Also
see USDA, Cocoa,  October  1981.
9These  two  assumptions  are  necessary  to keep  the  analysis  relatively  simple. Also,  it is not  necessarily  true  that
other  cocoa  producers  would  have  responded  had  CMte  d'Ivoire  imposed  a higher tax  and/or  devalued.  For a game-
theoretical  application  of export  taxes  on cocoa see Panagariya  and  Schiff  (1990).
24Cote d'Ivoire it was assumed  that other producing  countries  would not have changed  their export taxes
or producer prices in response to the changes  in Cameroon. This assumption  may be more justifiable
for Cameroon  than in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, since  Cameroon  produces a much  smaller share of world
production.
3.3.  Impact of Alternative  Export Tax and Exchange  Rates Policies  by Cote d'lvoire
3.3.1.  Impact on the World Cocoa Market
The impacts  of alternative  export  tax rates in Cote d'Ivoire for key variables of the world cocoa
market are shown in Table 3.1.  As in section  II, values are reported for 1989/90  and for the cumulated
totals for the period 1982/83-1989/90.  A comparison  is made between  actual  values  and the results from
the counter-factual  scenarios.
If Cote d'Ivoire had set its export  tax at 60% during the 1977-83  period, world production  would
have been 2.35 million tons-3.3% lower than actual production  in 1989/90. This is because a higher
tax rate puts a larger wedge between  the producer  and world prices, forcing  the producer price lower.
Tne small reduction in world production increases the world price of cocoa in terms of 1984/85 US
dollars to about 96c/kg-11.7% higher than the actual price of 86c/kg.  Because  of the inelasticity  of
world demand, the value of world production  of US$2.26 billion is 8% higher in the counter-factual
scenario. Lower production  and higher  prices cause world stocks and grindings  levels to be reduced  by
about 8% and 2.3%, respectively.
The cumulative  effect of the 60% export  tax rate in Cote  d'Ivoire over the period 1982/83-89/90
is for world  production  to be about 1.7% lower. Since  producer  prices of the other major West African
cocoa producing  countries are assumed  not to be linked  to the world price, there is no off-setting  supply
response  to higher  world prices. Stocks  and grindings  would  have been 4% and 1  % lower, respectively,
over the 1982/83-89/90  period, and on average, the real world  price of cocoa  would  have been about  3%
higher.  Finally, the cumulative  value of production  would  have been about 2.5% higher with the 60%
export tax rate.
In scenario II, with the tax rate in Cote d'Ivoire set at 40%, the producer price is lower than its
actual  level was and, as a result, production  in Cote d'Ivoire is below its actual level but not by as much
as in scenario I.  Therefore, all the effects on the world market are the same in terms of the direction
25of change, but are smaller in magnitude. In 1989/90, world production would have been 2.4 million
tons--1.4% lower than the actual  level.  As a result, the world price would have been 90c/kg in terms
of constant 1984/85 US dollars--about  4c/kg higher than the actual price.  This increase in the world
price causes the demand  for cocoa by consumers  and stock-holders  to fall by 1  % and 3.7%, respectively.
Finally, the value of production  is about  US$70 million  higher in 1989/90.
In Scenario III with a 40% tax rate and a real depreciation  of the CFA, the producer price of
cocoa in  Cote d'Ivoire is lower than the actual price but higher than in the two other scenarios.
Therefore, the directions  of the changes  in world market var.ables  are the same, but are the smallest in
magnitude.
26Table 3.1: Impact of Alternative  Export Tax and Real Exchange  Rate Policies in Cote d'Ivoire
on the World Cocoa Market
Scenario  World  Real  Real Value  of  World  World
Production  Price  Production  Stocks  Grindings
('000 tons)  (1984/85  C/kg)  (1984/85  Mil. $)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)
Factual 3'  1989/90  2,435.0  86.01  2,094.3  1,473.0  2,193.0
Cumulative"  16,145.0  165.502/  25,362.4  6,729.0  15,296.0
Scenario  r.  1989/90  2,354.5  96.05  2,261.4  1,358.0  2,142.5
Cumulative"  15,870.0  170.102  26,005.9  6,450.7  15,136.2
Scenario  IP.  1989/90  2,404.1  90.03  2,164.5  1,419.0  2,172.0
Cumulative"  16,017.8  167.402/  25,649.2  6,598.2  15,222.5
Scenario  IMO.  1989/90  2,412.6  89.30  2,153.8  1,425.6  2,175.0
Cumulative"  16,029.4  167.30'  25,634.5  6,606.5  15,227.9
I/  Cumulative  for the period 1982/83-1989/90.
2/  Average 1982/83-1989/90.
3/  Actual case.
4/  Optimal  tax (60%). Government  has rational  price expectations,  farmers have naive price expectations.
5/  Optimal  tax (40%). Government  and farmers  have the same  price expectations.
6/  Optimal  tax (40%). Real depreciation  of CFA (i.e., real exchange  rate at 1984/85  level). Government  and
farmers  have the same price expectations.
27Table 3.2: Impact of Alternative  Export Tax and Real Exchange  Rate Policies
in Cote d'Ivoire on Cote d'Ivoire
Scenarios  Producer  Govemnent  Total  Value of  Production
Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
--- (1984/85  US$ mill.)  ('000 tons)
FactualV  1989/90  148.7  51.0  199.7  653.5  710.0
Cumulative"  2,900.3  1,908.3  4,808.6  7,757.3  4,707.0
Scenario  1I'.  1989/90  129.7  78.6  208.3  636.5  619.3
Cumulative  2,374.1  2,531.2  4,905.3  7,694.3  4,410.5
Scenario  11.  1989/90  141.7  63.4  205.1  650.1  674.7
Cumulative  2,567.1  2,348.7  4,916.0  7,732.9  4,570.4
Scenado IIP.  1989/90  253.1  298.7  551.8  653.2  683.8
Cumulative  3,342.1  4,792.0  8,134.1  7,736.8  4,582.6
1/  Cumulative for the period 1982/83-1989/90.
2/  Actual case.
3/  Optimal  tax (60%). Government  has rational  price expectations,  farmers have naive price expectations.
4/  Optimal  tax (40%). Govermment  and farmers  have the same  price expectations.
5/  Optimal tax (40%). Depreciation  of CFA (i.e., real exchange  rate at  1984/85  level). Govermment  and
farmers  have the same price expectations.
3.3.2.  Impact on Cote d'lvoire
The impacts  of alternative  tax rates on Cote d'Ivoire are shown in Table 3.2.  Actual producer
surplus in 1989/90 was US$148.7 million, compared  to US$129.7 million in the scenario where Cote
d'Ivoire sets a tax rate of 60%.  This is because both the level of production and producer price are
lower. Government  revenue  changes  from US$51 million  to US$78.6  million, an increase  of about54%,
because  of the larger wedge placed between  the producer and world prices and because  the world price
is higher. The increase in government  revenue  overwhelms  the decline in producer  surplus, so that total
28welfare  increases  to US$208.3  million  in 1989/90,  about  4% above  the level actually  realized. Production
in Cote d'Ivoire in 1989/90  was 710,000 tons; if the tax rate had been set at 60% it would have been
about 13% lower at 619,300 tons. The value of production  is slightly  lower in the counter-factual  case,
because of lower production, despite  the Increase  in the world price.
In scenario  II, producer  surplus  is lower than what actually  occurred  because  both production  and
the producer price are lower.  However, government  revenue is higher because  of the higher tax rate.
The sum of the two is higher but by less than 3%.  Although  the world price is higher than the realized
price, the lower production  causes the value of production  to be lower, although  by only about 0.5%.
The simulated  effect of CFA real depreciation  on the cocoa  sector in Cote  d'Ivoire was important
as shown by the results for scenario  III.  The real depreciation  of the CFA causes the FOB price to be
higher  than its actual  level, and, although  the tax rate is higher  (40% instead  of about  30%), the producer
price is higher.'°  As a resut,  for 1989/90, producer surplus increases from US$148.7 million to
US$253.1 million, an increase of more than 70%.  The higher FOB price causes government  revenue
to be considerably  higher also--almost  six times its actual level.  Interestingly,  production  for 1989/90
is lower at 683,800 tons (compared  to 710,000 tons actual)  despite higher producer prices in the post-
1985  period.  Production is lower because the tax rate was higher in the 1977-83  period, resulting in
fewer new plantings. The higher producer prices in the post-1985  period are not in place long enough
in the simulation  for production  to recover because  of the lags in the response  of production  to price
increases (see Annex 11). If the simulation  had been continued  into the early-1990s  period, a positive
supply response  would have been observed.
3.3.3.  Impact on Cameroon
The impacts of different export  tax rates in Cote d'lvoire on Cameroon  are shown in Table 3.3.
With actual  export  tax levels  in Cote  d'Ivoire,,producer  surplus  and the level of production  in Cameroon
'"For these scenarios,  the producer price for Cote d'Ivoire was determined  by the following  relationships:
Producer  Price  =  FOB Price - Marketing  Cost - Export Tax;
Tax  =  Tax Rate * FOB Price;
FOB Price  =  f(Exchange  Rate, World Cocoa Price).
In this case, the tax rate is determined  exogenously  and the producer  price is endogenous. For the rest of the West
African  producers, the producer  price is specified  as in Annex  11. That is, the producer price is exogenous  and the
tax rate is endogenous.
29were U$51.3  million and 125,000  tons, respectively,  in 1989/90. If the tax rate had been increased  to
60%, Po changes would have occurred in these variables  because  they are determined  by the producer
prices which are not affected  by policy changes  in Cote d'Ivoire directly  or by changes in world cocoa
market conditions. However, the higher  world  price leads  to an increase  in government  revenue  (because
of higher taxes) and in producer surplus. As well, the increase  in the world price causes the value of
production  to increase from US$120.7 million  to US$134.8 million.
For scenarios II and III, production and producer surplus are the same as in the actual case.
Government  revenue is higher because  of the increase  in the world cocoa  price resulting  from the lower
production.  The sum of producer surplus and government revenues is about 5% and 4% higher,
respectively,  for scenarios  II and III, compared  to the actual  level. The value of production  is higher in
these scenarios  because of the higher world price of cocoa.  In scenario II, the value of production is
about 5% higher than the base case, and in scenario  III it is 4% higher.
30Table 3.3: Impact of Alternative  Export  Tax and Real Exchange  Rate Policies
in Cote d'Ivoire on Cameroon
Scenario  Producer  Government  Total  Value  of  Production
Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
------------------ (1984/85  US$  ill.)--  -------  ('000 tons)
FactualV  1989/90  51.3  7.4  58.7  120.7  125.0
Cumulative"  594.2  504.6  1,098.8  1,744.3  955.0
Scenario  P'.  1989/90  51.3  14.1  65.4  134.8  125.0
Cumulative  594.2  544.4  1,138.6  1,805.0  955.0
Scenario  TV'.  1989/90  51.3  10.1  61.4  126.4  125.0
Cumulative  594.2  521.8  1,116.0  1,771.1  955.0
Scenario  1s.  1989/90  51.3  9.6  60.9  125.3  125.0
Cumulative  594.2  521.1  1,115.3  1,769.6  955.0
1/  Cumulative  for the period  1982!83-1989/90.
2/  Actual  case.
3/  Optimal  tax (60%).  Govermment  has rational  price  expectations,  farmers  have  naive  price  expectations.
4/  Optimal  tax (40%).  Government  and farmers  have  the same  price  expectations.
s/  Optimal  tax  (40%).  Real  depreciation  of CFA  (i.e., real  exchange  rate  at 1984/85  level).  Government  and
farmers  have  the same  price  expectations.
3.3.4.  Inmact on Ghana
The impacts of alternative  tax rates in Cote d'Ivoire on Ghana are shown in Table 3.4.  No
changes  in production  or producer  surplus  are shown  in the counter-factual  scenarios  because  the tax rates
in Cote  d'Ivoire are assumed  to have  no effect  on producer  prices in Ghana. The results show  that Ghana
31Table 3.4: Impact of Alternative  Export Tax and Real Exchange Rate Policies
in Cote d'Ivoire on Ghana
Scenario  Producer  Government  Total  Value  of  Production
Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
------------------------- (1984/85  US$  mill.)------------------------  ('000 tons)
Factual'  1989/90  17.0  87.8  104.8  298.1  295.0
Cumulative"  817.0  -763.7  53.3  3,165.8  1,742.0
Scen-.  P.  1989/90  17.0  117.3  134.3  332.9  295.0
Cumulative  817.0  -659.8  157.2  3,293.0  1,742.0
Scenario  II.  1989/90  17.0  100.6  117.6  312.1  295.0
Cumulative  817.0  -717.2  99.8  3,222.6  1,742.0
Scenario  HIP.  1989/90  17.0  98.7  115.7  309.4  295.0
Cumulative  817.0  -719.8  97.2  3,218.9  1,742.0
I/  Cumulative  for the  period  1982/83-1989/90.
2/  Actual  case.
3/  Optimal  tax  (60%).  Government  has  rational  price  expectations,  farmers  have  naive  price  expectations.
4/  Optimal  tax  (40%).  Government  and farmers  have  the same  price  expectations.
5/  Optimal  tax  (40%).  Real  depreciation  of CFA  (i.e., real exchange  rate  at 1984/85  level). Government  and
farmers  have  the same  price  expectations.
is made better off by the higher tax rates in Cote d'Ivoire, through the impact  of the higher world cocoa
price. Government  revenue  and the value  of production  in 1989/90  were actually  US$87.8 and US$298.1
million,  respectively. If Cote d'Ivoire had set its export  tax rate at 60%, these  would have  been as much
as US$117.3 million and US$332.9 million.
For scenarios II and III, production and producer surplus are the same as in the actual case.
Government  revenue is higher because  of the increase  in the world cocoa price.  Total welfare is about
12% and 10% higher, respectively,  for scenarios  II and m, compared  to the actual level.  The value of
32production  is higher in these scenarios  because  of the higher world price of cocoa.  In scenario II, the
value of production  is about 5% higher  than in the base case, and in scenario III it is 4% higher.
3.3.5.  Impact on Nigr
The impacts  of alternative  export  tax policies in Cote d'Ivoire on Nigeria are reported in Table
3.5.  If the tax rate had been set at 60%, the value of production  would  have  been US$164.4 in 1989/90,
Table 3.5: Impact of Alternative  Export Tax and Real Exchange  Rate Policies
in Cote d'Ivoire on Nigeria
Scenario  Producer  Government  Total  Value of  Production
Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
------------- (194/8US$  miill.) ---  -- -------  ('000 tons)
Factual"  1989/90  35.9  0.0  35.9  147.2  160.0
Cumulative"'  417.4  -334.5  82.9  1,858.0  1,082.0
Scenario  I".  1989/90  35.9  24.6  60.5  164.4  160.0
Cumulative  417.4  -239.9  177.5  1,922.3  1,082.0
Scenario  I4l.  1989/90  35.9  15.6  51.5  154.1  160.0
Cumulative  417.4  -268.8  148.6  1,886.7  1,082.0
Scenario  II'.  1989/90  35.9  14.6  50.5  152.8  160.0
Cumulative  417.4  -270.2  147.2  1,884.8  1,082.0
1/  Cumulative  for the period 1982/83-1989/90.
2/  Actual case. Tax rates at their actual levels.
3/  Optimal  tax (60%).  Government  has rational  price expectations,  farmers  have naive price expectations.
4/  Optimal tax (40%). Government  and farmers  have the same  price expectations.
5/  Optimal  tax (40%). Real Depreciation  of CFA (i.e., real exchange  rate at 1984/85  level).  Government  and
farmers have the same  price expectations.
compared to the actual value of US$147.2 million-an increase of almost 12%.  Government  revenue
would also have been higher because the higher world price would have caused the tax collected on
33exports to be greater.  Total welfare in this counter-factual  case is US$60.5 million for  1989/90,
compared  to only US$35.9 million actually.
For scenarios II and 111,  production and producer surplus are the same as in the actual case.
Government  revenue is higher because of the increase in the world cocoa price as a result of lower
production. Total welfare is about  43% and 41% higher, respectively,  for scenarios  II and III, compared
to the actual level. The value of production  is higher in these  scenarios  because  of the higher  world price
of cocoa.  In scenario II, the value of production is about 5% higher than in the base case, and for
scenario III it is 4% higher.
3.3.6.  Impact on Cote d'lvoire. Cameroon.  Ghana. and Nigeria
The combined  impacts  of alternative  export tax policies in Cote d'Ivoire on the four major SSA
cocoa  producers  are reported  in Table 3.6. Over the 1982/83-89:90  period, the level of cocoa production
in Cote d'Ivoire was 11  % lower as a result of the reduced production  induced  by the higher tax rate.
However, because of the impact of lower production on the world price, the accumulated  value of
production  was slightly  higher (1.3%).  This is not a surprising  result given  the price-inelastic  nature of
cocoa demand.  Total welfare increased  by 5.5% as a result of imposing  the 60% tax (because  of the
higher government  revenue in all four countries)  despite  the small decline  in combined  producer  surplus.
3.4.  Impact  of Alternative  Export Tax and Exchange  Rate Policies in Cameroon
3.4.1.  Impact  on the World Cocoa Market
The impacts of alternative  export tax rates in Cameroon for key variables of the world cocoa
market are shown in Table 3.7.  In 1989/90  actual  world  production  was 2.43 million  tons. If Cameroon
had reduced its export  tax to 9% during the 1977-83  period (scenario  IV), world production  would have
been 2.47 million  tons (1.6%) higher.  The small increase in world production reduces  the world price
of cocoa in terms of 1984/85  US dollars to about 820/kg-4.5% lower than the actual  price of 860/kg.
Because  of the inelasticity  of world demand, the value of world production  of US$2.0 billion is 3.3%
lower than in the actual case.  Higher production  and lower prices cause world grindings levels to be
increased  by about 1.0%.
34Table 3.6: Impact of Alternative  Export Tax and Real Exchange  Rate Policies
in Cote d'Ivoire on Cameroon,  Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria  Combined
Scenario  Producer  Government  Total  Value of  Production
Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
-..- ---------- -------- (1984/85  US$ nill.)  -------  ('000 tons)
Factual 2/  1989/90  252.9  140.2  393.1  1,219.5  1,290.0
Cumulative"  4,728.7  1,314.7  6,043.6  14,525.4  8,486.0
Scenario  1I".  1989/90  233.9  234.9  468.8  1,268.6  1,199.3
Cumulative  4,202.7  2,175.9  6,378.6  14,714.6  8,189.5
Scenario  II<.  1989/90  245.9  189.7  435.6  1,242.7  1254.7
Cumulative  4,395.7  1,884.5  6,280.2  14,613.3  8,349.4
Scenario mIn '. 1989/90  357.3  421.6  778.9  1,240.9  1,263.8
Cumulative  5,170.7  4,323.1  9,493.8  14,610.1  8,361.6
I/  Cumulative  for the period 1982/83-1989/90.
2/  Actual  case.
3/  Optimal  tax (60%). Government  has rational  price expectations,  farmers  have naive price expectations.
4/  Optimal  tax (40%). Government  and farmers  have the same price expectations.
5/  Optimal  tax (40%). Real depreciation  of CPA (i.e., real exchange  rate at 1984/85  level). Government  and
farmers have the same  price expectations.
35Table 3.7: Impact of Alternative  Export Tax and Real Exchange  Rate
Policies  in Cameroon  on the World Cocoa  Market
Scenario  World  Real  Real  Value  of  World
Production  Price  Production  Grindings
('000 tons)  (1984/85  C/kg)  (1984/85  Mil. $)  ('000 tons)
Factual 3'  1989/90  2,435.0  86.0  2,094.3  2,193.0
Cumulative"  16,145.0  165.509'  25,362.4  15,296.0
Scenario  IV'.  1989/90  2,466.2  82.1  2,024.2  2,214.8
Cumulative"  16,301.9  160.62'  24,795.4  15,407.2
Scenario  VS.  1989/90  2,491.6  79.8  1,988.4  2,227.9
Cumulative"  16,362.2  159.82'  24,694.2  15,438.6
i/  Cumulative  for the  period  1982/83-1989/90.  2/  Average  1982/83-1989/90.
3/  Actual  case.
4/  Optimal  tax  (9%).  Government  and farmers  have  the  same  price  expectations.
5/  Optimal  tax (9%).  Real  depreciation  of CFA  (i.e., real exchange  rate at 1984/85  level).  Govermment  and
farmers  have  the same  price  expectations.
The cumulative  effect of the 9% export  tax rate in Cameroon  over the period 1982/83-1989190
is for world production to be about 1% higher, because of higher production in Cameroon.  Since
producer  prices of the other major west African  cocoa  producing  countries  are assumed not to be linked
to the world price, there is no off-setting  supply response  to lower world prices. Grindings  would have
been 0.7% higher over the 1982/83-1989/90  period and, on average,  the real world  price of cocoa  would
have been about 3% lower.  Finally, the cumulative  value of production  would have been about 2.2%
lower.
In scenario  V, the tax rate in Cameroon  was set at 9% and a real depreciation  of the CFA was
assumed. This increases  the producer  price more than in scenario  IV.  As a result, all the effects on the
world market are the same in terms of the direction  of change  but are larger in magnitude.
36In 1989/90, world production would  have been 2.47 million  tons--2.3% higher than the actual
level. As a result, the world price is 80c/kg in terms  of constant  1984/85  US dollars--about  6c/kg lower
than the actual price.  This decline in the world price causes the demand for cocoa by consumers  to
increase by 1.6%.  Finally, the value of production  is about US$106  million lower in 1989/90.
3.4.2.  Impact on Cameroon
The impacts  of different  export  tax rates in Cameroon  on Cameroon  itself  are shown  in Table 3.8.
Actual  producer surplus  in 1989/90  was US$51.3  million, compared  to US$65.8 million  in the scenario
where Cameroon  sets a tax rate of 9%.  This is because  both the level of production  and producer price
are higher.  Government revenue declines from US$7.4 million to US$6 million.  The increase in
producer surplus overwhelms the decline in government revenue, so that total welfare increases to
US$71.9 million in 1989/90--about  22% above the level actually realized  for 1989/90.  Production  in
Cameroon  in 1989/90  was 125,000  tons; if the tax rate had been set at 9% it would  have  been about 28%
higher at 160,500 tons.  The value of produiction  is higher in the counter-factual  case because of the
higher production,  despite  the fall in the world cocoa price.
The real depreciation  of the CFA has an important  impact  on the cocoa sector in Cameroon  as
shown by the results for scenario V.  This causes  the FOB price to be higher  than its actual  level so that
the producer  price is higher. As a result, for 1989/90,  producer  surplus  increases  from the realized  level
of  US$51.7 million to US$76.8 million-an increase of almost 50%.  The higher FOB price causes
government  revenue to be considerably  higher as well.
The combined impacts of alternative  export tax policies in Cameroon on the four major SSA
cocoa producers can be expected  to be fairly small because  Cameroon is a relatively small contributor
to the world cocoa market.  The kinds of policy changes  considered  here would cause the world price
to change by less than 3%.
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Table 3.8: Impact of Alternative  Export  Tax and Real Exchange
Rate Policies  in Cameroon  on Cameroon
Scenario  Producer  Government  Total  Value of  Production
Surplus  Revenue  Welfare  Production
----.---- (1  984/85  US$ mill.)-  ('000 tons)
Factual 2f  1989/90  51.3  7.4  58.7  120.7  125.0
Cumulative"  594.2  504.6  1,098.8  1,744.3  955.0
Scenario WV 31. 1989/90  65.8  6.0  71.9  147.9  160.5
Cumulative  696.7  162.8  859.5  1,957.5  1,126.9
Scenario  V4. 1989/90  76.8  15.8  92.6  167.8  187.3
Cumulative  728.4  217.7  946.1  2,012.2  1,189.1
1/  Cumulative  for ths period 1982/83-1989/90.
2/  Actual case.
3/  Optimal  tax (9%). Government  and farmers  have the same  price expectations.
4/  Optimal  tax (9%). Real depreciation  of CFA (i.e., real exchange  rate at 1984/85  level). Government  and
farmers  have the same price expectations.
38IV.  Conclusions and Discussion
The paper reports an analysis  of the impacts of macroeconomic  and sector-specific  policies in
major SSA cocoa  producing  countries  on the cocoa subsectors  of these countries  and on the world market
for cocoa. We chose to study cocoa because  it is an important  commodity  in several countries in SSA,
including Ghana and Nigeria, both of which recently  undertook  structural adjustment  programs.  Also,
SSA countries  have significant  market  shares in world  cocoa  production  and hence  policy  changes  in these
countries  can have a considerable  impact  on the world cocoa  market. This aspect is relevant  because  of
the questions  raised about the flow-on effects  from countries  undertaking  SAPs which lead to increases
in production  of perennial  export crops.
To evaluate  the effects  of the policy changes,  we used a global econometric  model  of the cocoa
market with supply of major producing countries  specified  by the vintage-capital  app%roach.  Choice  of
the analytical  tool is of great importance. It is important  for the analysis  to be global  to take into account
the reactions by other producing  countries  and by consumers. Also, it is important  to use the vintage-
capital approach  to modeling supply because the effects of policy changes only become evident in the
perennial  sector several years after they are implemented. The long gestation  period for perennials  is a
key factor to be taken into account  when designing  and analyzing  policies affecting  perennial  crops.
The simulation  results show  that world cocoa prices would  have been on average 8% higher and
the value of world cocoa production  6% higher  on average  had there not been any structural adjustment
programs in Ghana and Nigeria  over the period 1982/83-1989190.  This result is not surprising  because
world demand  for cocoa  is inelastic. It should  be noted  that the impact  of the SAPs  in Ghana  and Nigeria
on world cocoa prices was relatively small when viewed against  the sharp decline in world prices that
took place during the 1980s. World cocoa prices in constant 1985 dollar terms declined from about
US$1,900/ton  in the early 1980s  to about US$850/ton  in the late 1980s-a decline  of 55%.  Accormng
to the simulation  results, world cocoa  prices would  have been about  US$1,060/ton  in the late 1980s  had
there not been SAPs in Ghana and Nigeria-45% lower than prices which prevailed in the early 1980s.
The major part of the world cocoa price decline in the 1980s  can be attributed  to the rapid production
increases  in other countries-Cote d'Ivoire, Indonesia,  and Malaysia. These countries,  encouraged  by the
high world cocoa prices in the late 1970s  and the introduction  of new high-yielding  varieties, increased
their production sharply throughout  the 1980s-Malaysia  increased production  by about 200,000 tons,
39Indonesia's  production  increased  by about  85,000  tons, and Cote d'Ivoire's production  increased  by about
400,000 tons.  By comparison,  it is estimated  that Ghana's production  increased from 159,000  tons to
295,000 tons due to its SAP.
The benefits to Ghana from the adjustment  program were large.  Had Ghana not implemented
the program, its production would have been almost one half of what it actually was in  1989/90.
Producers' welfare (measured  as producers surplus)  would have  been substantially  lower in the absence
of the program and the government's budget  deficit would have been at an unsustainable  level.  Given
the continuing  efforts to reduce  marketing  costs through  the liberalization  of its cocoa marketing  system,
Ghana's production  is likely to increase even further. The impacts  on the cocoa sector are only part of
the story, of course. The SAP should  have positive  impacts  on other sectors, particularly  export  sectors-
albeit with a lag because  of investor  wariness  about the staying  power of the policy changes.
The effects of the adjustment  program in Nigeria up to  1989/90 are mixed.  The simulation
results show lower production  but higher total welfare without the adjustments. The main reason for
these results is that we are able to evaluate  the effects only three years after the implementation  of the
program.  Given the lagged response  of perennial crop production  to changes  in incentives,  it is most
likely that Nigeria's total welfare  would be seen to be higher  under the SAP if the evaluation  were made
in the mid-1990s.
The simulation results also show that for the four  major SSA cocoa producing countries
combined,  the structural adjustment  programs in Ghana and Nigeria increased  what we have called  total
welfare of the four SSA producers by 12% over the period 1982/83-1989/90  and total production !n
1989/90  was 15%  higher. Thus, the effects  of the programs  on SSA  as a whole  have been  positive,  while
having adverse effects in other cocoa producing  countries such as Brazil, Indonesia  and Malaysia.
The structural adjustments  in Ghana and Nigeria  have also had negative  effects  on Cameroon  and
Cote d'Ivoire, because they led to lower world prices.  However, problems of greater significance  for
the cocoa sectors in these countries  have  been their real exchange  ra:e and producer  pricing  policies. As
discussed  by Trivedi and Akiyama  (1992), u is very difficult  for these countries  to maintain  competitive
cocoa subsectors  when their real exchange  rates are over-valued. The simulation  results  on Cote d'Ivoire
and Cameroon suggest that the cocoa sectors in the two countries would have fared better had the
40government  implemented  export taxes closer to their "optimal"  level, jointly with a depreciation  of the
real exchange  rate. From the simulation  runs on Cote d'Ivoire we have the result that had the export tax
on cocoa been  higher and closer  to what is estimated  to have  been the optimal  level in the 1980s,  Ivorian
total welfare would have been about the same but with lower cocoa production.  In spite of the lower
production, Ivorian export revenue from cocoa would have been about the same due to higher world
prices.  It is to be noted too that probably  total agricultural  production and export revenue would have
been higher because labor and land not engaged  in cocoa production  would have been used to produce
other agricultural  commodities  for domestic consumption  or export.
The results also suggest  that the world cocoa market is, in a sense, not different from industrial
goods markets  where market share is lost if productivity  is not increased  in line with that of competitors.
The recent production  increases  in Indonesia  and Malaysia  have shown  vividly  that SSA countries  cannot
base their competitiveness  on favorable climate and cheap labor alone.  SSA countries should aim at
increasing  productivity  or reducing  production  and marketing  costs to keep cocoa  production  competitive
with other major producers.
The impact of Ghana and Nigeria's policies  on other producers raises the question  as to whether
such policies can be justified; what if similar  policies are also implemented  by other producers? To put
the situation in context as far as Ghana and Nigeria are concerned, it should be remembered  that their
earlier poor policies led to declines in production  and to world prices being higher than they would be
otherwise.  This upward pressure on prices no doubt made some contribution to the expansion of
production  in Cote  d'Ivoire and in other countries. Should  Ghana  and Nigeria  therefore not have adopted
these SAPs or adopted  policies leading  to diversification  out of cocoa, thereby permanently  forfeiting  a
larger share of the world market? It makes no economic  sense for Ghana and Nigeria to have done so
as they would be forfeiting comparative  advantage  in cocoa  production  which they clearly  possess.
Our view is that all cocoa producing  countries' interests would be best served if they adopt
market-based  real exchange rates, free up producer prices, privatize their marketing and distribution
channels,  and adopt  sensible  policies on export  taxes. If this means  that world prices would be lower on
average, this has to be accepted as unavoidable  and countries  have to compete within such a market.
Lower prices would not preclude profitable  production,  but some countries would be forced to reduce
production  and to move into other activities. The issues  to be faced  up to, especially  by SSA producers,
41include: how to improve  the rate of growth of productivity;  how to lower marketing  costs and improve
quality; and how to  improve the supply response of other export activities, whether agricultural,
manufacturing  or services.
The issue of what rate of export  tax to adopt  is a vexing  one.  If all large countries  adopted  their
optimal  tax rate" 1 and if such countries  used marginal  revenues 12 in planning  production expansion,  the
so-called "adding  up" problem would  disappear. Until recently, export  taxes levied on cocoa  worldwide
were likely much higher than the optimal level in aggregate;  nearly all producers levied export taxes as
this is a major form of taxation  for small, commodity-dependent  economies. Recent structural  adjustment
programs  and the low level of cocoa  prices  have led to a substantial  reduction  of export taxes. It is likely
that if prices rise, export  taxes will be increased;  but whether  they will  go back to their earlier high levels
is questionable.
Other issues  relevant  to the appropriate  level of the export  tax are: whether  even large producers
have any monopoly  power in the long run, because  of the impact  of substitutes;  and the use of such taxes
for strategic  purposes. History suggests  propping up prices through use of export taxes or international
agreements  eventually  leads to loss of markets. The experiences  of jute, tin, and possibly coffee, give
support  to this view.  Without similar action by other large producers, implementation  of an export tax
may simply lead to loss of market share as Ghana's pre-1983 experience  in cocoa and Cote d'Ivoire's
experience  with withholding  cocoa from sale in 1990 would attest.  If export taxes are applied, it is
important  that the rates are reviewed in the light of changes  in the market and changes  in tax rates by
other countries.
Finally, if a large cocoa producing  country is to increase  its production,  it may be preferable  to
do so through  production  cost reduction  measures  rather  than through  area expansion  measures. If a large
"  Using  a rule-of-thumb  measure  for estimag  the optmal export tax rae  and assumg  wodd cocoa
production  to be about  2.75  million  tons  and  the  share  of Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ghua, Nigeria  and Cameroon  to be 26X,
13%,  7%, and 4%, respectively,  in the  year 2000,  the  optimal  export  tax rates  for these  countries  are: 33%  for
CMte  d'Ivoire;  17%  for Ghana;  8% for Nigeria;  and  5% for Cameroon.
12  When  a  large- wcoa  producing  country expands  itS  production,  its marginal  revenue  is not the world  price
because  of the  pnoe-depressing  effect  through  the  inelastic  world  demand. The  marginal  revenue  from  increased
exporti  is lower the larger the  country's market  share.  For example,  if a country  holds nearly 30% of the  world
market,  its marginal  revenue  would be less than one half of the world  price.
42producing  country  increases  its production  through area expansion  while  maintaining  the same production
cost structure, the welfare of existing growers declines because of the lower world prices caused by
increased  production. The impact  on existing  producers  is considerably  reduced  if production  expansion
is achieved  through production  cost reduction.
43Annex I
Structural  Adjustment Programs of Major Cocoa Produdng  Countries In SSAAl.l.  Ghana's Cocoa Sector and the Structural  Adjustment  program
A1.1.1.  Backgrund
Following  a series of internal  and external  shocks,  compounded  by poor economic  management,
Ghana's economy deteriorated considerably during the  1970s and early-1980s.  The government
bureaucracy  grew enormously  and became  highly inefficient, budget deficits ballooned and inflation
increased. Also, the real value of the cedi appreciated  considerably,  causing  the terms of trade to move
sharply against  the export sector. A foreign exchange  crisis followed  as exports became  uncompetitive
and as manufacturers  lost market share to cheaper imports.
To address  these problems, the government  introduced  quantitative  restrictions  on imports  and
limited  the supply  of foreign  exchange. However,  these  measures  only exacerbated  the decline  in the rate
of economic  growth.  As the economy  declined, government  tax revenues fell, forcing major cuts in
recurrent and capital  public expenditures. In addition  to these measures,  the government  tried to control
inflation by imposing price controls and introducing a system of rationing.  This distortion of price
signals and market incentives  led to growth of the black market, corruption,  smuggling,  and tax evasion.
In addition  to the effects  of poor policies,  Ghana's economy  suffered  from a series of internal  and
external shocks. A drought in the early-1980s  caused severe food shortages which sent food pricss to
unprecedented  levels. During  this period  international  commodity  price movements  led to a sharp adverse
movement in Ghana's terms of trade.  In particular, the higher price of crude oil led to a serious
deterioration  in the balance  of trade, which was worsened  by falling revenues  from lower international
cocoa  prices.
The impact of these events on Ghana's economy are well illustrated by comparing leading
indicators for 1970 and 1982.  Between  these years, per capita income fell 30% in real terms, while
domestic  saving and investment  declined  from 12% and 14% of GDP, respectively,  to almost nothing.
Prices increased at an annual average rate of 44%, while real export earnings  fell 52%.
Since 1983, the government  has pursued a program  of structural adjustment. This has included
a number  of phases: the Economic  Recovery  Program (1983-86);  SAP  Phase 1  (1987-89);  and SAP  Phase
II (1989-90). The objectives  of the reforms were to: (i) shift relative prices in favor of production  for
exports; (ii) restore fiscal and monetary discipline  and stability; (iii) initiate rehabilitation  of Ghana's
45productive base  and economic infrastructure; and (iv) restore incentives for  private savings and
investment. These measures  included  significant  institutional  reform in the areas of trade and exchange
rate  policy,  cocoa sector restructuring, state-owned enterprises, and  public resource and sector
management.
Al.1.2.Performance of Ghana's Cocoa Sector  During the 1980s
A number  of policy  changes  were introduced  within  the cocoa sector as part of the SAP covering
the production, marketing,  and export  of cocoa. Among  the major objectives  of the reforms were to: (i)
increase production  by improving  producer price incentives;  (ii) reduce the size and operating costs of
the Ghana Cocoa  Board (COCOBOD);  (iii) remove the barriers to entry placed on the private sector in
input supply, marketing,  and processing;  and (iv) intensifying  research on new technology  and disease
control.
The production  of cocoa in Ghana was  highly  variable  during the 1980s. This is shown in Table
A1.1.  Production  fell by more than 100,000 tons between 1980/81  and 1983/84 as a result of poor
producer incentives,  combined  with severe  climatic  conditions. Since  the SAP was introduced,  increases
in cocoa  production  have been achieved,  with production  reaching  300,000  tons in 1988/89  and 295,000
tons in 1989/90.
46Table Al.1:  Ghana:  Cocoa Production  and Export Values, 1980/81-90/91
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83  1983/84  1984/85 1985/86  1986/87 1987/88  1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
------  '--000  tons-
Pmoducton  258  225  178  159  175  219  228  188  300  295  295
---  Non-nta  Codi  Bn. ----------
Export  Value  1.1  1.1  6.3  12.9  18.3  41.6  80.3  93.6  112.2  116.7  129.9
1989/90  Codi  Bn.  -------
Expost  Value
(constant  tenmn)l/  20.0  14.2  43.1  52.9  69.7  130.4  181.0  158.3  151.7  116.7  99.9
1/ CPI Deflaed.
Source:  I,  P  Lad  1G1U  & Duffus,  London.
Al.1.3.Impact of Changes  in Exchange  Rates and Inflation on Ghana's Cocoa Sector
Under the structural adjustment  program, major reforms took place in exchange rate policy.
Beginning  in 1983, the currency  was devalued  from cedi 2.7 per US dollar to cedi 90 per US dollar by
the beginning  of 1986.  In September  of that year, an auction system was established covering  almost
two-thirds  of all external  transactions. By February 1987, the auction rate was cedi 150  per US dollar,
and by the beginning  of 1989 it had fallen further  to cedi 230 per US dollar.  In early 1988, the auction
system was widened  to cover almost all external transactions,  and most foreign exchange  controls on
imported items were removed. The government  also established  a number  of non-governmental  foreign
exchange  bureaus which are permitted  to buy and sell foreign exchange  independent  of the market rate.
By 1990, the auction exchange rate was cedi 326 per US dollar, close to the rate established in the
foreign exchange  bureaus and in the parallel foreign exchange  market.  The differential  between these
rates is expected  to become  even smaller in the future, as the coverage  of external  transactions  using  the
auction market is widened.
Ghana experienced  high rates of inflation  throughout  the 1980s  (see Table A1.2). In the early-
1980s,  widespread  production  shortages  and the oil price shock caused  prices to rise considerably;  while
the rapid devaluation  of the cedi in the mid- and late-1980s  fuelled  this inflation. The rapid inflation  of
the early-1980s,  together with the fixed nominal exchange  rate, caused a rapid appreciation  of the real
47exchange  rate (see Table A1.2).  Between  1980  and 1983  the real exchange  rate index  increased almost
five-fold. With the devaluation  of the cedi  between 1983  and 1984  the real exchange  rate index  fell from
470 to only 64.  Since  then, the real exchange  rate has been on a steady downtrend. The main impact
of the massive devaluation in  1984 was to dramatically alter the terms of  trade,  increasing the
competitiveness  of the export sector.
Table A1.2: Ghana: Inflation Rate, and Nominal and Real Exchange  Rate, 1980-9e
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Nominal  2.7  2.7  2.7  3.4  35.3  54.4  89.2  153.7  202.3  270.0  326.1
Exchange
Rafe (cedi$)
Consumer  100.0  216.5  264.8  590.1  824.1  909.1  1,132.7  1,583.7  2,080.0  2,604.6  3,601.9
Price bdox
Real/  100.0  216.5  264.8  470.4  64.1  46.0  34.9  28.3  28.3  26.5  30.4
Exchang Rate
Souce:  IMP, Financial Statistic.
Real exchange  rate is calculated  with  the formula,
RER, = (NER/N  R  * (CPV/CPI6,)
RER, = Real exchange  raec  at time t,
NER, = Nominal  exchane rat  in 1980,
NER, = Nominal  exchange  rate at time  t,
CP1&  = Consumor  price index  at time  t, and
CPI  = Conmr  price  index  in 1980.
A1.  1.4.The Inmact of Producer Pricing and Taxation  in Ghana's Cocoa Sector
Cocoa marketing  in Ghana is controlled  by the Cocoa Board (COCOBOD)  which organizes  all
stages of marketing,  from purchases  at the farmgate  through  exports or domestic  sales. The COCOBOD
sets producers' prices and taxation, determines  the terms and conditions  of purchase, and the dates of
opening and closing of the cocoa season (Varangis, Akiyama, and Thigpen, 1990).  Cocoa prices,
marketing  costs, and export taxes for the 1980s  are reported in Table A1.3.
48Table A1.3: Ghana:  Domestic  and Export Cocoa  Prices, Marketing  Costs,
and Export Taxes, 1981/82-90/91
1981/82  1982/83 1983/84  1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88  1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
- Cedi/KO  -
Producer  Price" (a)  12.0  12.0  20.0  30.0  56.6  83.3  140.0  165.0  174.4  224.0
Real  Producor  Pree'  155.5  82.2  82.1  114.2  117.4  187.8  236.8  223.1  174.0  172.3
Maudking  Costs  (b)  12.8  24.2  36.3  48.0  55.2  86.4  138.4  90.7  96.7  123.2
CostatthePot(c)=(a)+(b)  24.8  36.2  56.3  78.0  111.8  169.7  278.4  255.7  271.1  347.2
Acua  CIP Price  (d)  5.3  6.0  77.4  132.5  196.0  286.6  391.9  413.1  459.6  518.2
Freoigt  & bmuanc  (e)  0.4  0.4  3.9  7.2  14.9  23.8  31.6  33.9  44.6  54.8
Atua  FOB  Price (f)=(d)-(e)  4.9  5.6  73.6  125.5  181.1  262.8  360.3  379.1  415.0  463.4
impli  Ta  xt=()l4e)  -19.8  -30.5  17.2  47.5  69.3  93.0  81.9  123.5  143.9  116.2
Tax  Rate  (%)  gh)=S/(f)  .42.7  -541.  23A  37.9  38.2  35.4  22.7  32.6  34.7  25.1
"I niudes Pemnium  1984/85-1988/89.
2D  Leflatd  by CPI (1989/90 = 100).
Scumee:  ICCO  and  Wordd  Bank
In  1981/82, Ghana's cocoa  producers received  a price of cedi 12/kg which, added  to marketing
costs of cedi 4.6/kg, gave  a cost at the port of cedi 16.6/kg. Given  the highly  over-valued  exchange  rate,
the actual cost at the port was only cedi 4.9/kg, giving an implicit  subsidy  to growers of cedi 11.7/kg,
or 237% of the actual  cost at the port.  After the 1982/83  crop season, the cedi depreciated  significantly,
with the result that the acual  cost at the port (  measured  in cedi) increased in each year up to and
including  1990/91, despite  the decline  in international  prices  of cocoa. Producer prices increased  in real
terms between 1983/84 and 1987/88, but thereafter declined,  as nominal  producer price increases  were
less than inflation. Marketing  costs also declined (in nominal  terms) in 1988189  as COCOBOD  made
cuts in its expenditures. The overall impact  of these price changes  on tax rates is shown in Table A1.3.
Between 1983/84  and 1990/91  tax rates ranged between  20% and 40% of the actual  cost at the port.
49Al.2.NiEeria's Cocoa Sector  and the Structural  Adjustment  Proj:am
AL.2.1.ackgr=nd
In the 1970s, large oil revenues provided the government  of Nigeria with the opportunity to
increase  expenditures  on improving  infrastructure  and non-oil  productive  capacity. The rapid growth of
the public sector altered relative internal prices and wages, changing  the underlying structure of the
economy.  The exchange rate appreciated  substantially  during the 1970s which, together with higher
domestic costs, led to a loss  of competitiveness  of its major exports in international  markets. Especially
hard hit was the agricultural  sector, with its share of non-oil GDP falling from 50% in the early 1970s
to 30% in  1980.  In an attempt to protect domestic industries  from foreign competition  and to curb
inflation,  the government  introduced  widespread  trade restrictions  through import licensing  and quotas.
During the oil boom years, government  expenditure  kept  pace with oil revenues. However,  when
the oil price fell in the early-1980s,  expenditures  were not reduced  in line with declining  revenues. As
a  result, large deficits accrued which were paid for by public sector borrowing, a  run-down of
international  reserves, and a large-scale  accumulation  of arrears on external  trade payments. In 1984,
the goveroment  responded  by making  spending  cuts and introduicing  additional  import  restrictions. While
these cuts lowered the fiscal and external deficit, the economic infrastructure  of the economy was
severely damaged. Production in most sectors fell and unemployment  rose.  By 1985, investment  had
fallen to about one-third of its level in real terms in 1981.  The economic  woes of the country were
worsened  in 1983  and 1984  by a severe drought which dramatically  lowered  agricultural  production  and
sent food prices to record levels.
In August 1985, the government  embarked on a major structural adjustment  program aimed at
redressing the economic  decline. The program included an exchange  rate and trade reform, designed
to foster economic efficiency and long-term economic growth.  The program was also aimed at
maintaining  economic  stability  and restoring  balance  of payments  equilibrium.
A1.2.2.  Performance  of the Nigerian  Cocoa  Sector During the 1980s
Nigeria's  cocoa  production  declined  from about  250,000  tons in the early-1970s  to around  80,000
tons in 1986/87  (Table A1.4). Since  then, production  has rebounded,  reaching 160,000  tons in 1989/90.
This improvement  followed  a number  of adjustments  made to the cocoa marketing  system, in addition
to the devaluation  of the naira.
50In 1986, the Nigerian  Cocoa Board (NCB)  was abolished  and the crop purchasing  system was
deregulated. Produce inspection  and quality control  procedures  employed  by the NAB were abandoned
and the licensing  system for crop buyers was dissolved. Export trade licenses  were also abolished.
Table Al.4:  Nigeria: Cocoa Production  and Export Values, 1980/81-90/91
19S0/81  1981/82  1982/83 1983/84  1984/85 1985/86  1986/87  1987/88 1988/89  1989/90 1990/91
- '000  tom --
Production  156  183  156  115  151  110  80  150  160  160  160
-- Nominal  Naiu Bn.  -
Export Value  102  134  210  203  184  408  654  1,294  1,327  1,271  NA
_  1989/90  Naim  Bn.  -
Export Valuc  535  637  850  587  474  1,028  1,486  2,258  1,535  1,271  NA
(constait terms)1/
1/ Dcflated by CPI.
Source:  IMP, Finarncial  Stalistio and Gill  & Duffbs,  London.
PAO,  TIadl Yearboo
The new marketing  system  relies exclusively  on private traders and exporters. At first there was
a deterioration  of quality of the cocoa beans marketed,  in part because  there were no provisions  for
grading and quality control.  However, the main reason for quality deterioration  was the existence  of
exchange  rate controls  which created a high premium for foreign exchange. This led exporters  to enter
the cocoa business in order to get access to hard currency which could be exchanged in the parallel
market for huge profits.  This distortion  of the marketing  system  was largely removed  when the foreign
exchange  market was liberalized  (Varangis,  Akiyama, and Thigpen, 1990).
Al.2.3.mpact  of Exchange  Rate and Inflation  Changes  on Nigeria's Cocoa Sector
Before  the structural adjustment  program started, the exchange  rate was set by the government
and foreign  exchange  was allocated  in an arbitrary way. In September  1986, the government  introduced
the Second-Tier  Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM).  This established  a floating exchange  rate system
51in which a price mechanism  was used to allocate foreign exchange  among competing  users.  In July
1987, the official First-Tier rate and the market-determined  rate were unified into one system, the
Foreign Exchange Market (FEM). This system allocated  foreign exchange  by auction.
Changes in the value of the naira during this period are shown in Table A1.S.  Between 1980
and 1985, the naira was maintained  at a high level vis-a-vis  the US dollar.  However, in 1987 (the first
full year of exchange  rate reform), the naira was devalued  to naira 4.02 per US dollar, compared  to naira
0.89 per US dollar in 1985.  Since the reforms were put in place, the naira has devalued in each year
up until 1991. By 1990, the naira had fallen to naira 8.04 per US dollar.
Table A1.S: Nigeria: Inflation  Rate, and Nominal  and Real Exchange  Rate, 1980-90
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Nomind  0.55  0.61  0.67  0.72  0.77  0.89  1.76  4.02  4.54  7.36  8.04
Exchange
Rate (NaWS)
Consumer  100.0  120.8  130.1  160.3  223.8  236.1  248.8  274.1  378.9  571.6  614.6
Price ndex
Realt/  100.0  107.6  105.6  121.1  159.5  144.3  77.5  37.3  45.6  42.4  41.8
Exchange  Rate
Source:  IMP, Financial Stistics.
Real exchange  rate  calculabed  with  the formla,
RERt = (NER/NER.) * (CPV1CPIVD)
RER, = Real exchange  rate at time t,
NER. 0 = Nominal  exchange  rate in 1980,
NER, = Nominal  exchang rate at time t,
CP,  = Consumer  price index  at time  t, and
CPI 3 = Consumer  price  index in 1980.
The rate of inflation  was high throughout  the 1980s. The consumer  price index is determined
mainly by food prices which have a 75% weight  in the index. This explains  the rapid rise in inflation
during 1983  and 1984, as food prices soared in response  to lower food  production  following  the drought.
It also explains  why  the inflation  rate did not increase  dramatically  after the devaluation  of the exchange
rate in the 1986 to 1987 period, as food imports remained under tight licensing control.  The rapid
52inflation  at the end of the decade is also related to food price increases.
The real exchange rate is also reported in Table A1.5.  High levels of inflation led to the
appreciation  of the real exchange  rate in the early-1980s,  reaching a peak in 1984.  Between  1985 and
1987,  the real exchange  rate devalued  considerably,  and by 1987  the naira was about  one-quarter  of its
1985  value.  Since  then, the exchange  rate has remained  fairly stable.
Al.2.4.Producer Pricing and Taxation  in Nigeria's Cocoa Sector
Until its abolition in 1986, prices paid to cocoa producers were set by the Cocoa Marketing
Board. Between 1980  and 1986, prices were nearly constant  in nominal terms, resulting  in a decline in
real terms (see Table A1.6).
Table A1.6: Nigeria: Domestic  and Export Cocoa  Prices,
Marketing  Costs, and Export Taxes, 1981/82-90/91
1981/82  1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88  1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
Naiiu/KO -
Producer  Price' a/  1.30  1.30  1.40  1.50  1.60  6.50  7.50  12.00  9.00  9.00
Rea Produccr  Price  6.20  5.30  4.10  4.30  4.00  14.80  13.30  14.50  9.00  8.70
Marketing  Costa  b/  0.44  0.51  0.73  0.81  0.83  0.77  1.00  1.51  1.75  2.10
Explicit  Tax c/  0.00  0.0G  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.35  -1.36  -3.47  -0.77  -0.41
Cost at the Port d=a+b+c/  1.74  1.81  2.13  2.31  2.43  6.92  7.14  10.04  9.98  10.69
Actua FOB Price  e/  1.03  1.12  1.38  1.83  2.09  6.92  7.14  10.04  9.98  10.69
inplicit Tax f=ec-  -0.71  -0.69  -0.75  -0.48  -0.34  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Tax Rate (%) h=(f+c)/e /  -69.08  -61.91  -54.58  -26.40  -16.17  -5.13  -19.02  -34.58  -7.76  -3.84
"Includes Premium  1984/85-1988/89.
vDeflated  by CPI (1989/90  =  100).
Between 1986  and 1987, the price of cocoa was increased sharply, from naira 1.6/kg to naira
6.5/kg.  Since then, the nominal  price increased  to naira 12/kg in 1989  but fell to naira 9.0/kg in 1990.
53With the high rate of inflation,  real cocoa  prices fell significantly  during the late-1980s,  declining  one-
third between 1986 and 1990. Between 1981/82  and 1984/85, actual FOB prices increased, following
the trend of international  cocoa prices.  However, the value of the naira was maintained  at very high
levels vis-a-vis the US dollar, such that export prices, expressed in naira, were very low during this
period. As a result, producers were highly  subsidized.
After the abolition  of the marketing board in  1986, no taxes or subsidies were incurred by
producers. The depreciation  of the naira increased  the actual  cost of cocoa at the port.  In the absence
of data on marketing  costs during this period, in Table A1.6 these costs have been set equal to the actual
cost at the port less the producer  price. This gives reasonable  results for some years, except in 1986/87
and 1988/89, when it gives rise to negative  marketing  costs.  A possible explanation  is that in the post-
liberalization  period, distortions  in the exchange  rate regime led to increases  in the producer price. This
is because traders were competing  strongly for cocoa in order to export it and exchange the foreign
exchange  in the black market. This caused  the producer  price to exceed the FOB price after accounting
for domestic  marketing  costs.  Basically,  the exchange  rate regime led to a subsidy of the cocoa sector
equal  to the difference  between  the FOB price and the producer  price plus the domestic  marketing  costs.
A1.3. Cameroon's and Cote d'Ivoire's Cocoa Sector and their Structu  Adjustment  Progr
Al. 3.I.Backgmnl
SAPs in Cameroon  and Cote d'Ivoire included  reforms in the cocoa sectr.  As discussed  later,
both  countries relied on  a  centralized marketing system based on  what  is called the Caisse de
Stabilization. This system  provides  the producer  with a fixed  price.  The difference  between  this system
and the marketing board systems in Ghana and Nigeria is that domestic marketing and exports are
handled  by private agents, working on behalf of the Caisse.  If the FOB price determined  by the Caisse
is higher than the actual  FOB price, the exporters  pay the difference  to the Caisse. If the price is lower,
they receive the difference  from the Caisse.
In Cote d'Ivoire, the agricultural  sector adjustment  program  (ASAP)  of 1989/90  for cocoa  mainly
called for a reduction of the producer price due to the persistent  decline in world cocoa prices and the
inability  of the domestic  stabilization  fund to continue  supporting  producer  prices at the existing  levels.In
concert, payments along the domestic marketing chain were reduced.  The ASAP also called for
improvements  in the efficiency  and increased  transparency  in the operation  of the Caisse. Measures  were
54proposed  to streamline  operations,  improve  management,  transfer commercial  activities  to the private or
cooperative  sector and increase  the exposure of the Caisse to market forces.
In Cameroon, cocoa prices were reduced in 1989/90  for the same reason as in Cote d'Ivoire.
In addition, in 1990/91 ONCPB was abolished  and replaced by a smaller organization  called ONCC.
The stabilization  fund was also abolished  in 1990/91 and replaced by another stabilization  fund whose
purpose is to fix cocoa producer  prices within  a certain year, as opposed  throughout  a number of years,
with producer prices adjusting  to market forces from one year to another.
In this paper it was not possible to evaluate  the reforms in the cocoa  sectors of Cote  d'Ivoire and
Camero_u.  as they took effect only at the end of 1980s,  and some time is needed  before we can evaluate
their full impact.
A1.3.2.Performance  of Cameroon's  Cocoa Sector  During the 1980s
Throughout  the 1980s, Cameroon's cocoa  production was fairly stable but fell sharply in 1991
(see Table A1.7).  In  1980/81, production was 124,000 tons but fell to  106,000 tons in 1982/83.
Production  increased  slowly to 131,000 tons in 1987/88, averaging  around 122,000  tons in the second
half of the decade.  Real producer prices have fallen quite sharply throughout the period (see Table
A1.9).  The decline in production  after 1989 is obviously  pardy due to the low levels of real prices in
the late-1980s.
55Table A1.7: Cameroon:  Cocoa Production  and Export Values, 1980/81-1990/91
1980/8981/82  198V83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91
'000 tons  -------
Production  120  122  106  108  120  118  123  131  129  125  100
-----  - Bn. Nominal CFAF
Expoit Value  53.6  43.9  57.1  89.0  106.5  95.3  87.3  72.4  56.2  57.7  60.7
(current doluars)
Bn.  1989/90 CFAF
Export Value  100.8  72.4  82.4  112.5  130.4  115.1  96.7  72.3  56.7  57.7  60.1
(condant torrmn)jI
Source:  World Bank.
1/  Deflaed  by the CPI.
Table A1.7 also contains data on the value of cocoa exports.  Given that production  has been
fairly stable and domestic consumption  is negligible,  export volumes  also have been fairly stable  during
the 1980s.  Therefore, movements in the value of exports have been determined largely by the
international  price of cocoa.  As can be seen, export revenues doubled from CFAF 53.6 billion in
1980/81 to CFAF 106.5 billion in 1984/85. Since 1984/85, export values have declined  substantially
in both nominal and real terms.
A1.3.3.Impact of Changes  in Real Exchange  Rates and Inflation  on Cameroon's Cocoa Sector
During  the 1980s,  Cameroon  experienced  rapid inflation,  with the consumer  price index  doubling
over this time (see Table A1.8).  The real exchange  rate depreciated  during the first half of the 1980s,
but after 1985  the trend was reversed, with an appreciation  of almost 75% in real terms between 1985
and 1989.  This rate of appreciation  was greater than that of many of Cameroon's competitors  in the
international  cocoa market (e.g., Brazil, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria), leading to a decline in
Cameroon's competitiveness  in producing  and exporting  cocoa.
56Table A1.8: Cameroon:  Inflation Rate, and Nominal  and Real Exchange  Rates, 1980-90
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Nominal
Exchange  211.3  271.7  328.6  381.1  437.0  449.3  346.3  300.5  297.5  319.0  272.3
Rate (CFA/S)
Consumer  100.0  110.6  124.2  145.1  161.5  163.6  176.2  186.8  203.3  202.8  204.0"'
Price  Index
Rest  100.0  86.0  79.9  80.5  78.1  76.9  107.5  131.4  144.4  134.4  147.51"
Exchange  Rate
Souc:  IM,  Fcinia  Stics.
I"  porecant.
2'  Real  exchnge rae  i  calcuated with  the formula,
;tER,  =  (NER/NERJ  * (CPICP10)
RER, = Real exchange  rate  at time t,
NER., = Nominal  exchange  rate in 1980,
NER,  =  Nominal exchang  rate at time t,
CPI, = Consumer  price  index at time  t, and
CPL6 - Consmer  pric,  index in 1980.
Al.3.4.Changes in Producer Pricin  and Taxation  in Cameroon's Cocoa Secto
During the period under investigation  (1980-90),  producer prices for cocoa in Cameroon  were
set each year by the government,  under the direction  of the Office National  de Commercialization  des
Produits de Base (ONCPB),  a parastatal  overseeing  pricing and exporting  of major export commodities.
The ONCPB  was setting 'equilibrium' prices for each stage of the production/marketng  chain, including
the price paid to growers.  When the domestic price was set below the world cocoa price, a tax was
imposed  equal to the difference  between  domestic  and international  prices. When  the domestic  price was
set above  the international  price, producers  were paid an export  subsidy out of a stabilization  fund.  As
of the cocoa year 1990/91, certain important  changes  were put into effect. ONCPB was abolished  and
replaced  by a small successor  organization,  ONCC, and the inter-annual  stabilization  fund was replaced
by a seasonal  stabilization  fund. The difference  between  the two funds is in the function  they serve: the
inter-annual  fund aimed at stabilizing  producer  prices for a number  of years while  the seasonal  fund aims
at stabilizing  producer prices within  a certain  year only.
57Cocoa  prices, marketing  costs, and export  taxes for cocoa  are presented  in Table A1.9.  Between
1981/82 and 1985/86  producer prices increased from CFAF 310/kg to CFAF 450/kg.  The costs of
marketing  increased steadily during this period, while an explicit tax of CFAF 57/kg was imposed.
Combining  the producer price, marketing  cost, and explicit  tax gave a cost at the port for cocoa which
increased from CFAF 430.9/kg in 1981/82 to CFAF 596.2/kg in 1985/86.  During this time period,
international  cocoa  prices were increasing  rapidly in terms of the CFAF as the CFAF depreciated  against
the US dollar.  As shown in Table  A1.9, the actual FOB price (i.e., the CIF price adjusted for freight
and insurance) almost doubled in nominal terms from CFAF 523.6/kg in 1981/82 to CFAF 954.8 in
1984/85.  Comparing  the cost at the port and the actual FOB price shows that a large implicit tax was
levied on cocoa exports, increasing  from 17.7% in 1981/82  to 38.9% by 1984/85.
Table A1.9: Cameroon: Domestic  and Export Cocoa  Prices, Marketing  Costs,
and Export Taxes, 1981/82-1990/91
1981/82  1982183 1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91
- CPAFIKO-
Producer Price" (a)  310.0  330.0  370.0  440.0  450.0  450.0  450.0  435.0  250.0  220.0
Real Producer Price  511.6  476.8  467.8  538.6  543.5  498.3  449.6  439.0  250.0  217.8
Mardeting Cods  (b)  63.9  76.6  84.8  86.7  89.2  90.1  89.9  68.8  68.8  51.3
Explicit Tax (e)  57.0  57.0  57.0  57.0  57.0  57.0  58.3  57.0  0.0  0.0
Costatthe  Portd=a+b+c  430.9  463.6  511.8  583.7  596.2  597.1  598.2  560.8  318.8  271.3
Actud CIP  Pnee  (e)  564.0  627.9  829.8  1,021.2  1,010.5  769.7  653.2  550.0  383.0  370.0
Freig  & Insurance (f)  40.4  47.6  56.5  66.4  66.1  56.9  49.3  42.4  42.4  42.4
Acal  FOB Price (g)=(e)-Q) 523.6  580.3  773.3  954.8  944.4  712.8  603.9  507.6  340.6  327.6
Implicit Tax (h)=(g)-(d)  92.7  116.7  261.5  371.1  348.2  115.7  5.7  -53.2  21.8  56.3
Tax Rate (%) (i)=(h+c)/(g)  28.6  29.9  41.2  44.8  42.9  24.2  10.6  0.7  6.4  15.2
Source:  World Bank, Etude Diagnostic do l'ONCPB.  FPbrier, 1989. AGRER
Includes Prenium  1984/85-1988/89.
v Deflated by CPI (1989/90=100).
58Starting in 1985/86, international  cocoa  prices declined. Between  1985/86  and 1989/90  the CIF
price of cocoa fell from CFAF 1,010/kg to CFAF 383/kg.  Despite  this decline, producer prices were
fixed in nominal  terms at CFAF 450/kg and the explicit  tax remained  unchanged. However, marketing
had begun to be reduced. As a result, the cost at the port was kept constant in nominal terms at about
CFAF 600/kg between 1985/86  and 1987/88  and declined  by a small amount  in 1988/89 as a result of
slightly lower marketing  costs.  The combined  effect was to reduce the implicit tax on exports, which
fell from 38.9% in 1984/85 to 0.9% in 1987/88, and by 1988/89  the FOB price had fallen to such an
extent that the tax rate turned negative, representing  subsidy  payments  of CFAF 53.2/kg in 1988/89 (a
rate of 10.5%).  By the 1989/90 season, the financial crisis faced by ONCPB led to a lowering of
producer prices to CFAF 250/kg, a decline  of 43% in real terms from the previous year's level.  Also
at this time, the explicit tax was removed, while the cut-back in marketing costs continued.  These
measures led to a substantial  reduction  in the cost at the port, falling from CFAF 561/kg in 1988/89  to
CFAF 319/kg in 1989/90.
A1.3.5.The Performance  of Cote d'Ivoire's Cocoa Sector  During the 1980s
Cote d'Ivoire is by far the world's largest supplier of cocoa, contributing  about 30% of total
production in 1989/90. Production  for the period 1980/81  through 1990/91 is shown in Table A1.10.
Production grew steadily in the 1980s, increasing  from 360,000 tons in  1982/83 to 849,000 tons in
1988/89. This growth was spawned  by high producer  prices, low labor costs, and the adoption  of higher-
yielding cocoa varieties.  The producer price was reduced substantially  in the late-1980s,  leading to a
decline  in production.
Cocoa is Cote d'Ivoire's largest foreign exchange  earner, providing  30% of the value of total
merchandise  exports in 1985  when the international  cocoa  price was $2,250/ton, and more than 28% in
1990. Cocoa  export values are shown in Table Al.10.  Despite  the sharp increase in export  volumes
59Table A1.10: Cote d'Ivoire: Cocoa Production  and Export Values, 1980/81-90/91
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83  1983/84  1984/85 1985/86  1986/87  1987/88 1988/89  1989/90 1990/91
'000 tons  -
Producdon  403  465  360  418  571  563  620  674  849  710  785
---  OBn.  Nominal  CPAF
Export  Value  199.7  163.3  162.7  396.6  398.4  392.9  312.6  242.2  208.9  213.6  194.0
(currnt dolars)
Bn. 1989/90  CFAF
Export  Valuo  284.1  215.2  203.9  472.7  467.1  432.7  326.6  243.4  208.1  213.6  256.0
(contaunt  dollars)j/
Source:  DMN,  Fiugial Statistis' and  G(1  & Duffus,  London.
1/ Deflated by tho CPI.
over the period, the value of exports increased only up until the mid-1980s, with close to CFAF 400
million earned in 1983/84, 1984/85, and 1985/86.  Since then, lower international  cocoa prices have
reduced  export earnings, and by 1990/91  cocoa is estimated  to have earned less than CFAF 200 million,
the lowest level (in nominal terms) since 1979/80.
A1.3.6.ImDact  of Changes in Real Exchange  Rates and Inflation on Cote d'Ivoire's Cocoa Sector
Cote d'Ivoire is one of the CFA zone countries  and therefore the nominal  value of its currency
is linked to the French Franc (CFAF 50 = FF 1) (Table Al.11).  As with Cameroon,  the over-valued
real exchange  rate in recent years has substantially  decreased  the competitiveness  of Cote  d'Ivoire cocoa.
The real exchange  rate, which provides a useful measure of international  competitiveness  is shown in
Table Al.11.  As seen there, the real exchange  rate depreciated  sharply  during the first half of the 1980s
but after 1985  this trend was reversed  just as sharply, with the real exchange  rate appreciating  more than
70% between 1985 and 1988.
A1.3.7.Impact of Changes in Producer Pricing and Taxation  in Cote d'Ivoire's Cocoa  Sector
The stated purpose of the government's cocoa pricing policy has been to: (i) provide cocoa
farmers with relatively  attractive, stable financial  returns in order to increae production; (ii) maximize
the contribution  made  by the cocoa  sector  to the economy;  and (iii) to provide  substantial  revenues  to the
60government.  Cocoa is purchased by private traders operating on behalf of the stabilization fund
(CSSPPA)  at the fixed producer  price.  It is then sold by private exporters  on behalf of the CSSPPA  or
directly  by the CSSPPA  to the world cocoa market. Taxation  on cocoa sales has been a crucial  source
of revenue  r the government.
Cocoa  prices, marketing  costs  and export  taxes  for Cote d'Ivoire are shown in Table Al. 12. The
trends of these data for the 1981/82-1990/91  period are very similar to those of Cameroon (see Table
Al.9).  Between 1981/82 and 1984/85, FOB cocoa prices increased in nominal terms from CFAF
554.6/kg to CFAF 926.5/kg.  During this period the cost at the port was kept significantly  below the
FOB price, with producer prices increasing  only 25% in nominal terms between 1981/82  and 1984/85.
The margin between  the FOB price and cost at the port increased from CFAF 134.9/kg in 1982/83  to
CFAF 370.6/kg in 1984/85,  representing  implicit  tax rates of 22.3% and 40%, respectively.
Since 1984/85, however, the nominal FOB price of Cote d'Ivoire cocoa  has fallen in each year
up to and including  1990/91. Despite  this decline,  producer  prices and marketing  costs were not adjusted
downwards  to reflect  changing  international  market  conditions  through 1988/89. The cost at the port was
kept within a range of CFAF 550/kg to CFAF 600/kg.  As a result, the implicit  tax fell after 1984/85
and by 1987/88  CSSPPA was paying a subsidy  to growers equal to about 12% of the FOB price.  The
continued decline of international  cocoa prices led to the subsidy rate increasing to 32% in  1988/89.
With the 1989/90 agricultural sector adjustment  program (ASAP), producer prices for cocoa were
reduced from CFAF 400/kg to CFAF 250/kg for the mid-crop (summer of 1989), and were reduced
further to  CFAF 200/kg for  1989/90.  This price reduction was necessary due to  the high  and
unsupportable  deficit incurred by the CSSPPA and the declining  world cocoa prices.'  The 1989/90
ASAP also tried to improve marketing  efficiency  by reducing  the domestic  operating costs of CSSPPA
and the domestic marketing  costs for cocoa.
'During 1988/89  a large  number  of cocoa  farmers  were  paid  with  lOUs  due  to the lack  of funds  in the CSsPPA.
61Table Al.11: Cote d'Ivoire: Inflation  Rate, and Nominal  and Real Exchange  Rates, 1980-90
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Nominal
xohange  211.3  271.7  328.6  381.1  437.0  449.3  346.3  300.5  297.5  319.0  272.3
Raw (F/$)
Consumer  100.0  108.8  116.8  123.7  129.0  131.3  140.9  141.4  151.4  152.9  154.0"
Pridc index
Real  100.0  84.6  75.1  68.6  62.4  61.8  86.0  99.4  107.5  101.2  119.5"
Exchge  Rate
Souc:  IM,  Fimw  Stds.
2'  mRel  oxchango  rte  is  ealuaed with  the formula,
RER,  = ONERMN  * (CPIJCPI)
REk  =  -Rel  xchange  rate at time  t,
NEROD Nominal  oxchang rate in 1980,
NMEP  =  Nominal  exchange  rat  at tine t,
CP& = Comnunme  price  index a  time  t, and
CP 0 =  Consumer  price index  in 1980.
62Table Al.12:  Cote d'Ivoire: Domestic  and Export Cocoa  Prices, Marketing  Costs,
and Export Taxes, 1981/82-1990/91
1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90 1990/91
---------- CFAFKG  ---------
Producer  Pricet' (a)  300.0  350.0  375.0  400.0  400.0  400.0  400.0  400.0  200.0  200.0
Real Ptoducer  Price'  401.7  431.6  448.4  470.4  444.0  435.3  413.0  403.9  200.0  199.0
Marketing  Costa  (b)  61.3  68.3  74.3  75.4  82.7  83.1  84.9  92.3  92.2  49.2
Explicit  Tax (o)  50.6  50.6  80.5  80.5  80.5  100.5  100.5  100.5  50.3  0.0
Cott  th  Port  d=a+b+c  411.9  468.9  529.8  555.9  563.2  583.6  585.4  592.8  342.5  249.2
Acul  CIF Price (e)  595.0  651.4  876.5  992.9  864.3  705.9  571.5  491.9  361.6  340.0
Freight  & hsrance  (f)  51.0  51.0  58.1  66.8  76.0  73.7  73.7  73.7  71.7  71.0
Actual  POB Price (g)=(e)-(f)  544.0  600.4  818.4  926.1  788.3  632.2  497.8  418.2  289.9  269.0
Implicit  Tax h)=(g)-(d)  132.1  131.5  288.6  370.2  225.1  48.6  -87.6  -174.6  -52.5  19.8
Tax Rate (%) (i)=(h+c)/(g)  33.6  30.3  45.1  48.7  38.8  23.6  2.6  -17.7  -0.8  7.4
Source: World  Bank,  CSSPPA.
" Include Premnium  1984/85-1988/89.
v Deflatd by CPI (1989/90 = 100).
Pre  .
63Annex H
The Cocoa ModelThe model consists of demand (for consumption  and stocks) and supply components,  with the
market price for cocoa determined  by the market clearing  identity  (see Table A2.  1).
A2.  1.  Production  Side
The supply block  consists  of eight separate  major producing  countries  and the rest of the world.
The major producing countries are: Brazil, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Nigeria.  For all countries  except Ecuador and Indonesia, supply is modeled using the
vintage capital  approach  developed  by Akiyama  and Trivedi (1987). A brief discussion  of this approach
is presented in the paragraph below.  For Ecuador, Indonesia, and the rest of the world, supply is
modeled in the conventional  way: with supply  as a function  of real producer  prices (current and lagged)
and a time trend.
In the case of perennial  tree-crops such as cocoa and coffee, special attention should  be paid to
three features of the production  process: (i) the output; (ii) the dependence  of current output on current
and, more significantly,  on previous  levels of inputs; (iii) the existence  of significant  costs of adjustment
with respect to planting and removal of the trees.  Conditions  (i) and (ii) imply that the relevant supply
specification  for perennial  tree-crops  is dynamic. The dynamics  arise from the fact that the productivity
of perennial tree-crops varies with the age (and variety) of the tree.  The age structure and varietal
composition  of a tree-crop plantation  determines  the production  capacity  or the maximum  feasible level
of production. Actual  production  can  vary from the production  capacity  due to climatic  reasons, intensity
of application  of fertilizer and pesticides  and the level of husbandry.
The vintage capital approach  to modeling supply is applied  as follows: first, the new plantings
are evaluated  as a function  of real producer  prices (current and lagged)  and a time trend. Using the new
plantings  and the yield curve the production  potential  is evaluated. Finally, production  is a function  of
the production  potential  and current real producer  prices.
A2.2.  Demand  Side
Total world grindings is used as the measure  of the demand for cocoa.  On a global level this
is fine, if one assumes  that exports and imports  of cocoa beans and products combined  are equal on a
global level. In fact, there is only a small difference  between  the two.
65World grindings is specified  to be a log-linear  function  of the deflated  world price (the ICCO
indicator  price) and the constant  dollar GDP of the G7 countries. The corresponding  elasticities  are -0.22
for the price and 0.47 for the GDP.
The low price inelasticity  of demand for cocoa is mainly  due to the low impact  of cocoa prices
on confectionery  products, where cocoa  products are mostly  used. Cocoa  prices account  for around 10-
30% of the cost of producing  chocolate. Milk and sugar prices, and advertising  costs, have a greater
impact on chocolate  bar prices.
The stock demand  equation  is modeled  as a function  of the deflated  world  price level aned  the one
and two year lagged moving  average of the world production  level.
66Table A2.1:  Overview  of the Cocoa  Model
A.  Production
New Plantings = f (real producer prices current and lags)
Production  Potential = New Plantings  X Yields
Production = f (real producer prices (current), Production  Potential)
Production  for Ecuador. Indonesia  and the Rest of the World
Production: f (real producer  prices currents  and lags
PD WOR (World  Production) =  E Productions  + Rest of the world
Producer Prices and other Variables  in the Sunply  Side
FOB = f (world price, exchange  rate)  FOB = f (world price, exchange  rate)
Producer price  =  exogenous  Producer price  =  (FOB - tax - marketing costs)
Tax =  (FOB - producer price - marketing costs)  Tax =  tax rate x FOB
Tax rate =  exogenous
Real producer  price = nominal/cpi  Government  revenue: tax x production
B.  Demand Side
GRWOR  (world grindings)  =  f (GDPG7,  real world price)
STKWOR  (stock demand) =  f (real world price, .5 x (PDWOR  (-1) + PDWOR (-2))
C. Price Determination
PDWOR + STKWOR  (-1) =  STKWOR  + GRWOR
This equation solves for real world price
A2.3.  Price Determination
The price determination  in a commodity  market largely depends on the structure of the market
in which that commodity  is traded.  For the case of cocoa  there is a widespread  presumption  that price
determination  follows the paradigm cf  competitive  markets, at least as a good first approximation.
According  to the competitive  market  paradigm,  the "price equation"  of the model should  conform  to the
law of "supply  and demand" in which price changes  should be a function  of the gap between  supply and
demand.
67The present model conforms with the paradigm of the competitive  market outlined above.  It
consists of a demand and a supply group of equations which yield world demand and supply.  An
inventory  demand  equation is also added  so that the level of stocks  at the end of each period  have to be
equal  to the demand for stocks. According  to this equilibrium  condition,  the price must 're  such that the
excess supply over  demand must be  willingly held.  With consumption, production, and  stocks
determined,  the model then searches  for the price that equilibrates  the market clearing identity:
PD + ES(-1) = ES + CS
where: PD is world production,  ES the level of stocks, and CS is world consumption.
A2.4.  Model Validatio
The results from the base-line simulation  can be compared with historical data to validate the
model. Two sets of validation  statistics  were calculated. These cover important  aspects  of the model's
ability to plot historical data and to respond to economic stimuli in a  manner consistent with both
economic  theory and empirical observation. The validation statistics include: (i) Root Mean Square
Percentage  Error (RMSPE), which provides a single value measuring  the average percent difference
between  predicted and actual values of the endogenous  variables, and (ii) Theil's U-statistic, which is
related  to the RMSPE and is scaled  so that U will lie between  0 and 1 (U = 0 represents  a perfect fit).
The validation statistics presented in Table A2.2 are based on a simulation  period from 1980/81 to
1989/90.
At the world level, the RMSPEs for cocoa production and stocks are 1.61% and 3.72%,
respectively. The RMSPE for the cocoa price is 11.83%. Thus, the model's tracking of the quantity
variables  tends to be better than it is for price.  This can be explained  by the inelasticity  of the supply
and demand curves in which inaccuracies  have a greater effect on price than quantity. For Cameroon,
COte d'Ivoire, and Ghana, the RMSPEs for production are less than 6%, indicating that the model
predicts  values very close to their actual  levels.
68Table A2.2: RMSPEs and Thiel U-statistics  for Selected  Cocoa Model Variables
Variable  RMSPE 1'  U-stat.
Production  1.61  0.008
Grindings  1.09  0.005
Stocks  3.72  0.013
Price  11.83  0.060
Cameroon
Production  6.08  0.028
Value of Production  13.57  0.062
C6te d'Ivoire
Production  2.57  0.014
Value of Production  9.00  0.043
Production  2.52  0.012
Value of Production  11.63  0.052
Production  14.12  0.061
Value of Production  23.57  0.095
u  RM-SPS  -llnE((A-P/A4
21 U =  l/nE((PCtAJw
tl/niYPJIa  + [1/aE.(AY91 1
Wham: A  the  achal vauo of an andogenow  viAble;
P=  the uinwaod value  of an  dogenou varable;  and,
a  - .w  umbet  of peioda in the  mudaion.
The RMSPE for Nigeriaes  production, at 14.12%, is moderately high.  However, carefil
inspection  of the actal  and simulated  results shows  that this RMSPE  is heavily  influenced  by a few large
discrepancies  in certain years, when Nigeria's cocoa sector experienced  major extrnal  shocks (e.g.,
drought in 1984), and that otherwise, the model tracks fairly well and captures most of the important
turning points in the actu  data.  The RMSPEs for the value of production capture errors in both
69production  and price variables. Cameroon,  C6te  d'Ivoire, and Ghana  have values  below 14%. The high
RMSPE for Nigeria  can be explained  by the inaccuracies  in production  forecasts  already  discussed. The
U-statistics  reported in Table A2.2 support  the RMSPE  results. That is, in general, the quantity  variables
out-perform  the price variables, with the exception  of Nigeria's production.  Nonetheless, all the U-
statistics presented are close to 0, indicating  that the model performs well.  Based on these validation
statistics it can be concluded  that the model gives a fairly accurate representation  of the actual world
cocoa market, and provides a reliable tool for policy analysis  and forecasting.
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